Fred Burton and Scot Stewart on Yemen:
The media wing of one of al Qaeda’s Yemeni franchises, al Qaeda in Yemen, released a statement on online jihadist forums Jan. 20 from the group’s leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, announcing the formation of a single al Qaeda group for the Arabian Peninsula under his command. According to al-Wuhayshi, the new group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, would consist of his former group (al Qaeda in Yemen) as well as members of the now-defunct Saudi al Qaeda franchise.
The press release noted that the Saudi militants have pledged allegiance to al-Wuhayshi, an indication that the reorganization was not a merger of equals. This is understandable, given that the jihadists in Yemen have been active recently while their Saudi counterparts have not conducted a meaningful attack in years. The announcement also related that a Saudi national (and former Guantanamo detainee) identified as Abu-Sayyaf al-Shihri has been appointed as al-Wuhayshi’s deputy. In some ways, this is similar to the way Ayman al-Zawahiri and his faction of Egyptian Islamic Jihad swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden and were integrated in to al Qaeda prime.
While not specifically mentioned, the announcement of a single al Qaeda entity for the entire Arabian Peninsula and the unanimous support by jihadist militants on the Arabian Peninsula for al-Wuhayshi suggests the new organization will incorporate elements of the other al Qaeda franchise in Yemen, the Yemen Soldiers Brigade.
The announcement also provided links to downloadable versions of the latest issue of the group’s online magazine, Sada al-Malahim, (Arabic for “The Echo of Battle”). The Web page links provided to download the magazine also featured trailers advertising the pending release of a new video from the group, now referred to by its new name, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The translated name of this new organization sounds very similar to the old Saudi al Qaeda franchise, the al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (in Arabic, “Tandheem al Qaeda fi Jazeerat al-Arabiyah”). But the new group’s new Arabic name, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab, is slightly different. The addition of “al-Jihad” seems to have been influenced by the Iraqi al Qaeda franchise, Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. The flag of the Islamic State of Iraq also appears in the Jan. 24 video, further illustrating the deep ties between the newly announced organization and al Qaeda in Iraq. Indeed, a number of Yemeni militants traveled to Iraq to fight, and these returning al Qaeda veterans have played a large part in the increased sophistication of militant attacks in Yemen over the past year.
Four days after the Jan. 20 announcement, links for a 19-minute video from the new group titled “We Start from Here and We Will Meet at al-Aqsa” began to appear in jihadist corners of cyberspace. Al-Aqsa refers to the al-Aqsa Mosque on what Jews know as Temple Mount and Muslims refer to as Al Haram Al Sharif. The video threatens Muslim leaders in the region (whom it refers to as criminal tyrants), including Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Saudi royal family, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. It also threatens so-called “crusader forces” supporting the regional Muslim leaders, and promises to carry the jihad from the Arabian Peninsula to Israel so as to liberate Muslim holy sites and brethren in Gaza.
An interview with al-Wuhayshi aired Jan. 27 on Al Jazeera echoed these sentiments. During the interview, al-Wuhayshi noted that the “crusades” against “Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia” have been launched from bases in the Arabian Peninsula, and that because of this, “all crusader interests” in the peninsula “should be struck.”
A Different Take on Events
Most of the analysis in Western media regarding the preceding developments has focused on how two former detainees at the U.S. facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appear in the Jan. 24 video — one of whom was al-Shihri — and that both were graduates of Saudi Arabia’s ideological rehabilitation program, a government deprogramming course for jihadists. In addition to al-Shihri who, according to the video was Guantanamo detainee 372, the video also contains a statement from Abu-al-Harith Muhammad al-Awfi. Al-Awfi, who was identified as a field commander in the video, was allegedly former Guantanamo detainee 333. Prisoner lists from Guantanamo obtained by Stratfor appear to confirm that al-Shihri was in fact Guantanamo detainee No. 372. We did not find al-Awfi’s name on the list, however, another name appears as detainee No. 333. Given the proclivity of jihadists to use fraudulent identities, it is entirely possible that al-Awfi is an alias, or that he was held at Guantanamo under an assumed name. At any rate, we doubt al-Awfi would fabricate this claim and then broadcast it in such a public manner.
The media focus on the Guantanamo aspect is understandable in the wake of U.S. President Barack Obama’s Jan. 22 executive order to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and all the complexities surrounding that decision. Clearly, some men released from Guantanamo, and even those graduated from the Saudi government’s rehabilitation program, can and have returned to the jihadist fold. Ideology is hard to extinguish, especially an ideology that teaches adherents that there is a war against Islam and that the “true believers” will be persecuted for their beliefs. Al Qaeda has even taken this one step further and has worked to prepare its members not only to face death, but also to endure imprisonment and harsh interrogation. A substantial number of al Qaeda cadres, such as al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi, have endured both, and have been instrumental in helping members withstand captivity and interrogation.
This physical and ideological preparation means that efforts to induce captured militants to abandon their ideology can wind up reinforcing that ideology when those efforts appear to prove important tenets of the ideology, such as that adherents will be persecuted and that the Muslim rulers are aligned with the West. It is also important to realize that radical Islamist extremists, ultraconservatives and traditionalists tend to have a far better grasp of Islamic religious texts than their moderate, liberal and modernist counterparts. Hence, they have an edge over them on the ideological battlefield. Those opposing radicals and extremists have a long way to go before they can produce a coherent legitimate, authoritative and authentic alternative Islamic discourse.
In any event, in practical terms there is no system of “re-education” that is 100 percent effective in eradicating an ideology in humans except execution. There will always be people who will figure out how to game the system and regurgitate whatever is necessary to placate their jailers so as to win release. Because of this, it is not surprising to see people like al-Shihri and al-Awfi released only to re-emerge in their former molds.
Another remarkable feature of the Jan. 27 video is that it showcased four different leaders of the regional group, something rarely seen. In addition to al-Wuhayshi, al-Shihri and al-Awfi, the video also included a statement from Qasim al-Rami, who is suspected of having been involved with the operational planning of the suicide attack on a group of Spanish tourists in Marib, Yemen, in July 2007.
In our estimation, however, perhaps the most remarkable feature about these recent statements from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is not the appearance of these two former Guantanamo detainees in the video, or the appearance of four distinct leaders of the group in a single video, but rather what the statements tell us about the state of the al Qaeda franchises in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Signposts
That the remnants of the Saudi al Qaeda franchise have been forced to flee their country and join up with the Yemeni group demonstrates that the Saudi government’s campaign to eradicate the jihadist organization has been very successful. The Saudi franchise was very active in 2003 and 2004, but has not attempted a significant attack since the February 2006 attack against the oil facility in Abqaiq. In spite of the large number of Saudi fighters who have traveled to militant training camps, and to fight in places such as Iraq, the Saudi franchise has had significant problems organizing operational cells inside the kingdom. Additionally, since the death of Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, the Saudi franchise has struggled to find a charismatic and savvy leader. (The Saudis have killed several leaders who succeeded al-Muqrin.) In a militant organization conducting an insurgency or terrorist operations, leadership is critical not only to the operational success of the group but also to its ability to recruit new members, raise funding and acquire resources such as weapons.
Like the Saudi node, the fortunes of other al Qaeda regional franchises have risen or fallen based upon ability of the franchise’s leadership. For example, in August 2006 al Qaeda announced with great fanfare that the Egyptian militant group Gamaah al-Islamiyah (GAI) had joined forces with al Qaeda. Likewise, in November 2007 al Qaeda announced that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) had formally joined the al Qaeda network. But neither of these groups really ever got off the ground. While a large portion of the responsibility for the groups’ lack of success may be due to the oppressive natures of the Egyptian and Libyan governments and the aggressive efforts those governments undertook to control the new al Qaeda franchises, we believe the lack of success also stems from poor leadership. (There are certainly other significant factors contributing to the failure of al Qaeda nodes in various places, such as the alienation of the local population.)
Conversely, we believe that an important reason for the resurgence of the al Qaeda franchise in Yemen has been the leadership of al-Wuhayshi. As we have noted in the past, Yemen is a much easier environment for militants to operate in than either Egypt or Libya. There are many Salafists employed in the Yemeni security and intelligence apparatus who at the very least are sympathetic to the jihadist cause. These men are holdovers from the Yemeni civil war, when Saleh formed an alliance with Salafists and recruited jihadists to fight Marxist forces in South Yemen. This alliance continues today, with Saleh deriving significant political support from radical Islamists. Many of the state’s key institutions (including the military) employ Salafists, making any major crackdown on militant Islamists in the country politically difficult. This sentiment among the security forces also helps explain the many jihadists who have escaped from Yemeni prisons — such as al-Wuhayshi.
Yemen has also long been at the crossroads of a number of jihadist theaters, including Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Levant, Egypt and Somalia. Yemen also is a country with a thriving arms market, a desert warrior tradition and a tribal culture that often bridles against government authority and that makes it difficult for the government to assert control over large swaths of the country. Yemeni tribesmen also tend to be religiously conservative and susceptible to the influence of jihadist theology.
In spite of this favorable environment, the Yemeni al Qaeda franchise has largely floundered since 9/11. Much of this is due to U.S. and Yemeni efforts to decapitate the group, such as the strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle on then-leader of al Qaeda in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi, in late 2002 and the subsequent arrest of his replacement, Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal, in late 2003. The combination of these operations in such a short period helped cripple al Qaeda in Yemen’s operational capability.
As Stratfor noted in spring 2008, however, al Qaeda militants in Yemen have become more active and more effective under the leadership of al-Wuhayshi, an ethnic Yemeni who spent time in Afghanistan as a lieutenant under bin Laden. After his time with bin Laden, Iranian authorities arrested al-Wuhayshi, later returning him to Yemen in 2003 via an Iranian-Yemeni extradition deal. He subsequently escaped from a high-security prison outside the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, in February 2006 along with Jamal al-Badawi (the leader of the cell that carried out the suicide bombing of the USS Cole).
Al-Wuhayshi’s established ties with al Qaeda prime and bin Laden in particular not only provide him legitimacy in the eyes of other jihadists, in more practical terms, they may have provided him the opportunity to learn the tradecraft necessary to successfully lead a militant group and conduct operations. His close ties to influential veterans of al Qaeda in Yemen like al-Badawi also may have helped him infuse new energy into the struggle in Yemen in 2008.
While the group had been on a rising trajectory in 2008, things had been eerily quiet in Yemen since the Sept. 17, 2008, attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa and the resulting campaign against the group. The recent flurry of statements has broken the quiet, followed by a Warden Message on Jan. 26 warning of a possible threat against the compound of the U.S. Embassy in Yemen and a firefight at a security checkpoint near the embassy hours later.
At this point, it appears the shooting incident may not be related to the threat warning and may instead have been the result of jumpy nerves. Reports suggest the police may have fired at a speeding car before the occupants, who were armed tribesmen, fired back. Although there have been efforts to crack down on the carrying of weapons in Sanaa, virtually every Yemeni male owns an AK-variant assault rifle of some sort; like the ceremonial jambiya dagger, such a rifle is considered a must-have accessory in most parts of the country. Not surprisingly, incidents involving gunfire are not uncommon in Yemen.
Either way, we will continue to keep a close eye on Yemen and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As we have seen in the past, press statements are not necessarily indicative of future jihadist performance. It will be important to watch developments in Yemen for signs that will help determine whether this recent merger and announcement is a sign of desperation by a declining group, or whether the addition of fresh blood from Saudi Arabia will help breathe new life into al-Wuhayshi’s operations and provide his group the means to make good on its threats.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Crossfit
Via Facebook, I've connected with a friend from junior high school who now owns a Crossfit gym. He is rabidly enthusiastic about Crossfit. It helped him lose 50 pounds and be "stronger, fitter, leaner" at 45 than he was at 25. Crossfit is an exercise regime that uses its website to designate a workout for each day, but they don't recommend embarking on a Crossfit program without a few hours of training with a certified Crossfit trainer (they are sprinkled about the country) to learn proper techniques and how to scale or modify the workouts for your fitness level. The daily workouts "as prescribed" are brutal. Observe. The first time I watched this video, I quit midway through thinking that I'd seen enough and gotten the picture. But I just watched it all the way through and realize that it just continues to get more compelling to the end. And the cameraman finally finds the story.
I did a miniature version of Sunday's workout and am still sore.
I did a miniature version of Sunday's workout and am still sore.
Monday, January 26, 2009
A post for Big Families
Putting aside all the demographic plusses the Mark Steyn discusses in America Alone, I had the privilege of attending a memorial service this weekend for a guy who died way too early at 48 (maybe off a bit on the age but far too young). I witnessed a Large Extended Family coming together is support of one another like I've never seen before.
I know that the support and love had a great deal to do with the Patriarch and late Matriarch of this family but also with the quality of their children one of whom was the subject of the service. It also had a great deal with the quality of the friends of those children (also speaking well of the Patriarch and Matriarch because of the childrens' choice of friends).
I was particularly touched by the feelings expressed by a (now adult) former stepson of the deceased. This stepson gave nothing but grief to his former stepfather in his late adolescent years...but acknowledged that his former stepfather had treated him like his real father (implicitly acknowledging that that means being chastised when the circumstances call for it).
The discussions, the hugs, the tears, the efforts to make things the best possible for the children of their late father...I was moved beyond belief.
Families make a big difference.
This family is special.
I know that the support and love had a great deal to do with the Patriarch and late Matriarch of this family but also with the quality of their children one of whom was the subject of the service. It also had a great deal with the quality of the friends of those children (also speaking well of the Patriarch and Matriarch because of the childrens' choice of friends).
I was particularly touched by the feelings expressed by a (now adult) former stepson of the deceased. This stepson gave nothing but grief to his former stepfather in his late adolescent years...but acknowledged that his former stepfather had treated him like his real father (implicitly acknowledging that that means being chastised when the circumstances call for it).
The discussions, the hugs, the tears, the efforts to make things the best possible for the children of their late father...I was moved beyond belief.
Families make a big difference.
This family is special.
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Book report: A Partisan's Daughter
This is de Bernieres' most recent novel. It is a departure in style from previous novels. Instead of a huge cast of characters, this has only two prominent characters. One is Roza, a 20-something single woman who meets Chris, a 50-something married man. When they meet, he believes she's a prostitute; she claims to have been a prostitute who's now out of the business. They forge a friendship over the course of months of periodic meetings. Each meeting is a story-telling session, with Roza telling Chris stories of big adventures (with a fair amount of cruelty) in her life. They're falling in love through this time, though neither admits their feelings. Spoiler alert: in the end, he gets drunk one night and offers to pay her for sex and calls her a bitch when she refuses. She's crushed, their friendship is over and their romance is over before it begins. We get a dose of Yugoslav/Serb/Croat history through Roza's life. I'm not recommending it. Had a decidedly Milan Kundera feel. If you want Milan Kundera, read Milan Kundera. If you want de Bernieres, read Birds Without Wings.
[Update: I've just re-read this and realized there are a couple things I should say. 1) as I've said in earlier posts, de Bernieres is one of my favorite authors who's written two of my all-time favorite books so I hold him to a higher standard; 2) I didn't mean to dis Milan Kundera; just saying that there's no reason to read de Bernieres channeling Kundera.]
Friday, January 23, 2009
Stratfor's Security Report
By Fred Burton and Ben West
[Links require registration for email.]
As Umar Israilov, a 27-year-old Chechen political refugee living in Vienna, Austria, returned home on foot after grocery shopping Jan. 13, he spotted two men standing outside his apartment building — one of whom had a gun. Upon spotting the men, Israilov dropped his groceries and fled down Leopoldauer Street in the Floridsdorf neighborhood of Vienna, dodging cars and pedestrians. But the gunman managed to wound Israilov, halting his flight. The two men then approached him in a side alley, where the armed man shot Israilov twice in the head, killing him.
One man has been detained in connection with the killing, which a Stratfor source alleges was carried out by organized criminal assets in Vienna at the behest of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and with Kremlin approval. Israilov was an outspoken critic of Kadyrov and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Because of this, Israilov had frequently expressed concerns for his safety and that of his family.
Before seeking asylum in Austria, Israilov fought during the Second Chechen War against Russian forces, which captured him in 2003. Afterward, he served as one of Kadyrov’s bodyguards, a position that gave him a front-row seat to the activities of Kadyrov, who at that time led the militia of his father, then-Chechen President Akhmed Kadyrov. (Ramzan Kadyrov became Chechen president in 2007, three years after his father’s assassination.) Israilov and the younger Kadyrov had a falling-out in 2004, after which Israilov said his former boss tortured him using electric charges.
Israilov fled to the West shortly thereafter, first seeking asylum in Poland and later obtaining asylum in Austria. Once in Europe, he often spoke out against Ramzan Kadyrov, filing complaints about his alleged torture with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, and talking to reporters from The New York Times about his experiences. While allegations that Kadyrov and his associates committed torture were not new, Israilov’s former position in Kadyrov’s circle set him apart as a dissident — and marked him as a security risk to his former employers due to his firsthand knowledge of how Kadyrov operates. Israilov reportedly told police in Vienna that he felt threatened and asked for extra security.
Austria has long been a popular place for political asylum-seekers who are facing threats due to their political views; providing adequate protection for all of these dissidents is impossible. Israilov further endangered himself by maintaining a relatively high profile due to his court filings and conversations with journalists. (He might have sought publicity in a bid to support himself and his family financially.)
Chechnya, Russia and the Israilov Killing
According to Israilov’s father, in June 2008 a Chechen visited the younger Israilov, showing him a hit list of 300 Chechens who oppose Kadyrov. Ramzan Kadyrov is well-known for not tolerating detractors, allegedly having ordered the deaths of dissenters before. While spokesmen for Kadyrov have distanced the Chechen president from the Israilov killing, saying the latter did not pose a significant threat to Chechnya, Israilov’s killing could well have been intended as an example to other Chechen dissidents who felt safe abroad. While Chechen dissidents routinely die or disappear under murky circumstances in their country, this is the first time a vocal Chechen dissident has been slain abroad. The brazen nature of Israilov’s killing in particular suggests an effort to highlight the vulnerability of exiled Chechen dissidents.
According to Stratfor sources, agents were not sent from Chechnya to carry out this operation. After getting permission from Moscow for the Israilov killing — Russia keeps a tight grip on Chechnya, so Moscow would interpret a unilateral assassination abroad as subversive — Kadyrov allegedly mobilized organized criminals in Austria to carry out the deed. While it is not clear exactly which organized criminal faction carried out the killing, the man detained in connection with the killing was a Chechen who has lived in Austria for several years under the name Otto Kaltenbrunner. While he has not been charged with anything, the getaway car was registered in his name — suggesting the involvement of Chechen organized crime, which has a strong presence in Russia and Europe as well as in the Caucasus.
As major fighting in the Second Chechen War wound down from 2005 to 2007, many of the militants who had fought the Russians disbanded and fled the country. These soldiers, highly trained and accustomed to using violence to get their way, had limited options beyond putting their skills to use with the various Chechen organized criminal factions that thrived in postwar Chechnya. Chechen gangs are prized for their high level of training and brutality, abilities that have proved very valuable to criminal groups in Russia, the Caucasus and Europe.
The high degree of professionalism in the Israilov killing tends to support the existence of a Chechen organized criminal angle. This professionalism includes the audacity of Israilov’s killers, who attacked in broad daylight on a busy street. It also includes their ability to kill Israilov (himself a militant trained under Kadyrov) without any significant struggle or collateral damage. Moreover, at least a low level of surveillance must have been carried out on Israilov’s residence to confirm that he lived there and to establish his schedule so the attackers could wait for him.
The Chechen leadership has a relationship with Chechen organized crime because of the military and security service background of many Chechen criminals, and because Kadyrov led these militias during the Russo-Chechen wars of the 1990s. Such a relationship could be called on in commissioning a killing in Vienna.
Using hired guns from Austria would allow any foreign entity that ordered the killing to distance itself from the crime. Even if Austrian police managed to track down and initiate a prosecution of those who carried out the killing, arranging the extraditions of suspects from Russia would be virtually impossible without Moscow’s cooperation. Russia has not cooperated with British authorities investigating the killing of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, for example, and the investigation has turned into a political skirmish in an already-tense relationship between the two countries. Attempting to pursue the Israilov case with Russia probably would bring a similar outcome for Austria: inconclusive findings and weakened relations with a Russia that is asserting itself much more than it did in 2006.
Suspicions of Moscow’s involvement in the assassinations of Russian dissidents by various means have become common in the past three years. Russian organized criminal groups, as well as the Russian domestic security and intelligence service, the FSB, are the most likely culprits behind the increase in high-profile assassinations of Russian dissidents over the last few years. Many of the assassinations have been connected to the issue of Chechnya and alleged human rights abuses there.
The Chechen wars are a sensitive issue for both Russians and Chechens. Those who stir up tales of past offenses by either side are seen as undermining the stability in Chechnya that has come about because of the ongoing alliance between Putin and Kadyrov. The suspicious deaths of individuals (followed by their date of death) who fall into this category include:
· Anna Politkovskaya, October 2006. A prominent journalist and critic of the Kremlin, Politkovskaya was in the process of publishing a series condemning the government’s policy in Chechnya. She was shot in the head in her apartment building.
· Alexander Litvinenko, November 2006. Litvinenko was a former KGB agent who had defected to the United Kingdom and published books on the internal workings of Putin’s FSB networks, and he was critical of the new Russian state. He was poisoned with radioactive polonium-210.
· Ivan Safronov, March 2007. Safronov was a journalist who criticized the state of the Russian military and was accused of leaking military affairs to foreign parties. He allegedly committed suicide by jumping from the fifth floor of his apartment building, though some reports say a person behind him forced him out of the building.
· Oleg Zhukovsky, December 2007. Zhukovsky was an executive of the VTB bank, which at the time of his death was being taken over by the state so the Kremlin could handpick its senior officers to oversee many strategic state accounts. Zhukovsky allegedly performed the feat of committing suicide by being tied to a chair and thrown into his swimming pool, where he drowned.
· Arkady Patarkatsishvili, February 2008. A wealthy Georgian-Russian businessman, Patarkatsishvili was extensively involved in Georgian politics. Patarkatsishvili died in the United Kingdom of coronary complications that resembled a heart attack. His family and many in Georgia have accused the FSB of involvement, however, saying the FSB has many untraceable poisons at its disposal.
· Leonid Rozhetskin, March 2008. Rozhetskin was an international financier and lawyer who held stakes in strategic companies, like mobile phone giant MegaFon. He disappeared while in Latvia after losing Kremlin backing by selling his assets to multiple parties, including some government ministers who are former FSB agents.
· Paul Klebnikov, July 2008. The editor of Forbes’ Russian edition, Klebnikov was shot dead in Moscow as he was heading into a subway station. The driver of a stolen car that pulled out of a parking lot and drove toward Klebnikov fired four shots before fleeing the scene.
· Ruslan Yamadayev, September 2008. Yamadayev was a Chechen military leader and former member of the State Duma. He was shot in his Mercedes as it was stopped at a red light near the Kremlin in Moscow.
· Stanislav Markelov, January 2009. A prominent Russian lawyer who had prosecuted an army colonel convicted of murdering a Chechen woman, Markelov was shot dead along with a journalist in broad daylight on a Moscow street near the Kremlin. He was also involved in the case of Anna Politkovskaya.
Vienna, City of International Intrigue
Vienna has long been a key battleground for international disputes between competing countries’ security and intelligence operatives. No stranger to international intrigue and attacks, the Austrian capital has had a reputation for assassination plots, intelligence gathering and foreign operatives conducting missions against dissidents who thought they were safe living in a Western city in an otherwise peaceful country.
In one example of this tradition, Iranian agents linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security shot and killed three members of a Kurdish delegation conducting negotiations with the Iranian leadership in 1989. Similarly, many cases of espionage between the United States and the Soviet Union unfolded in Vienna, including the cases of Marine Sgt. Clayton Lonetree and Felix Block, who passed information to the Soviets when he was second-in-command at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna. The Israilov case is thus probably only the latest in a long tradition of foreign intrigue.
Austria’s central location between the former Warsaw Pact countries of Czechoslovakia and Hungary and NATO countries of Italy and West Germany, along with Vienna’s official neutrality, made Austria a natural Cold War battleground. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States all focused intelligence-gathering capabilities there. And as Cold War battle lines are redrawn with Russia’s resurgence, the significance of places like Vienna re-emerges. Considering that these activities only began to slacken less than 20 years ago, old intelligence networks could be put into operation again with relative ease.
The blurring of the line between Russian intelligence agents and organized crime that occurred during the 1990s means that Russia still has a considerable network around the world, though now, elements of this network also are engaged in criminal activities. This network must be considered when looking at cases like that of Israilov.
Significantly, Austria is home to the largest Chechen refugee population in Europe. An estimated 20,000 Chechens — not all of them legal residents — live in the Central European country; many of them fled the bloody Chechen wars with Russia. In general, ethnic organized criminal outfits flourish among immigrants or refugee populations because they can offer illegal immigrants services that they cannot get from the state. They also flourish there because they can use the immigrant community to operate with more secrecy. This is because many immigrant communities live apart from the indigenous population, often in separate neighborhoods, speak a different language and generally stick together in opposition to their host country’s police services. Additionally, family bonds (intensified when around strangers) strengthen ties within immigrant communities, allowing for the kind of secrecy that lets organized crime thrive.
The establishment of a strong Chechen presence in Austria, along with a pre-existing Russian presence, means that Chechnya and Russia have a long reach in the country. Considering the organized crime-FSB nexus, the increase in politically motivated murders of Russian dissidents and how Moscow most likely was pleased with Israilov’s demise, Russian assets in Vienna could well have been involved in the murder. While Russia is broadly suspected of killing dissidents abroad in recent years, Chechnya is not known to have carried out attacks in the European Union before — meaning the Israilov killing will send chills down the spines of exiled Chechen dissidents.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to http://www.stratfor.com/
[Links require registration for email.]
As Umar Israilov, a 27-year-old Chechen political refugee living in Vienna, Austria, returned home on foot after grocery shopping Jan. 13, he spotted two men standing outside his apartment building — one of whom had a gun. Upon spotting the men, Israilov dropped his groceries and fled down Leopoldauer Street in the Floridsdorf neighborhood of Vienna, dodging cars and pedestrians. But the gunman managed to wound Israilov, halting his flight. The two men then approached him in a side alley, where the armed man shot Israilov twice in the head, killing him.
One man has been detained in connection with the killing, which a Stratfor source alleges was carried out by organized criminal assets in Vienna at the behest of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and with Kremlin approval. Israilov was an outspoken critic of Kadyrov and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Because of this, Israilov had frequently expressed concerns for his safety and that of his family.
Before seeking asylum in Austria, Israilov fought during the Second Chechen War against Russian forces, which captured him in 2003. Afterward, he served as one of Kadyrov’s bodyguards, a position that gave him a front-row seat to the activities of Kadyrov, who at that time led the militia of his father, then-Chechen President Akhmed Kadyrov. (Ramzan Kadyrov became Chechen president in 2007, three years after his father’s assassination.) Israilov and the younger Kadyrov had a falling-out in 2004, after which Israilov said his former boss tortured him using electric charges.
Israilov fled to the West shortly thereafter, first seeking asylum in Poland and later obtaining asylum in Austria. Once in Europe, he often spoke out against Ramzan Kadyrov, filing complaints about his alleged torture with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, and talking to reporters from The New York Times about his experiences. While allegations that Kadyrov and his associates committed torture were not new, Israilov’s former position in Kadyrov’s circle set him apart as a dissident — and marked him as a security risk to his former employers due to his firsthand knowledge of how Kadyrov operates. Israilov reportedly told police in Vienna that he felt threatened and asked for extra security.
Austria has long been a popular place for political asylum-seekers who are facing threats due to their political views; providing adequate protection for all of these dissidents is impossible. Israilov further endangered himself by maintaining a relatively high profile due to his court filings and conversations with journalists. (He might have sought publicity in a bid to support himself and his family financially.)
Chechnya, Russia and the Israilov Killing
According to Israilov’s father, in June 2008 a Chechen visited the younger Israilov, showing him a hit list of 300 Chechens who oppose Kadyrov. Ramzan Kadyrov is well-known for not tolerating detractors, allegedly having ordered the deaths of dissenters before. While spokesmen for Kadyrov have distanced the Chechen president from the Israilov killing, saying the latter did not pose a significant threat to Chechnya, Israilov’s killing could well have been intended as an example to other Chechen dissidents who felt safe abroad. While Chechen dissidents routinely die or disappear under murky circumstances in their country, this is the first time a vocal Chechen dissident has been slain abroad. The brazen nature of Israilov’s killing in particular suggests an effort to highlight the vulnerability of exiled Chechen dissidents.
According to Stratfor sources, agents were not sent from Chechnya to carry out this operation. After getting permission from Moscow for the Israilov killing — Russia keeps a tight grip on Chechnya, so Moscow would interpret a unilateral assassination abroad as subversive — Kadyrov allegedly mobilized organized criminals in Austria to carry out the deed. While it is not clear exactly which organized criminal faction carried out the killing, the man detained in connection with the killing was a Chechen who has lived in Austria for several years under the name Otto Kaltenbrunner. While he has not been charged with anything, the getaway car was registered in his name — suggesting the involvement of Chechen organized crime, which has a strong presence in Russia and Europe as well as in the Caucasus.
As major fighting in the Second Chechen War wound down from 2005 to 2007, many of the militants who had fought the Russians disbanded and fled the country. These soldiers, highly trained and accustomed to using violence to get their way, had limited options beyond putting their skills to use with the various Chechen organized criminal factions that thrived in postwar Chechnya. Chechen gangs are prized for their high level of training and brutality, abilities that have proved very valuable to criminal groups in Russia, the Caucasus and Europe.
The high degree of professionalism in the Israilov killing tends to support the existence of a Chechen organized criminal angle. This professionalism includes the audacity of Israilov’s killers, who attacked in broad daylight on a busy street. It also includes their ability to kill Israilov (himself a militant trained under Kadyrov) without any significant struggle or collateral damage. Moreover, at least a low level of surveillance must have been carried out on Israilov’s residence to confirm that he lived there and to establish his schedule so the attackers could wait for him.
The Chechen leadership has a relationship with Chechen organized crime because of the military and security service background of many Chechen criminals, and because Kadyrov led these militias during the Russo-Chechen wars of the 1990s. Such a relationship could be called on in commissioning a killing in Vienna.
Using hired guns from Austria would allow any foreign entity that ordered the killing to distance itself from the crime. Even if Austrian police managed to track down and initiate a prosecution of those who carried out the killing, arranging the extraditions of suspects from Russia would be virtually impossible without Moscow’s cooperation. Russia has not cooperated with British authorities investigating the killing of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, for example, and the investigation has turned into a political skirmish in an already-tense relationship between the two countries. Attempting to pursue the Israilov case with Russia probably would bring a similar outcome for Austria: inconclusive findings and weakened relations with a Russia that is asserting itself much more than it did in 2006.
Suspicions of Moscow’s involvement in the assassinations of Russian dissidents by various means have become common in the past three years. Russian organized criminal groups, as well as the Russian domestic security and intelligence service, the FSB, are the most likely culprits behind the increase in high-profile assassinations of Russian dissidents over the last few years. Many of the assassinations have been connected to the issue of Chechnya and alleged human rights abuses there.
The Chechen wars are a sensitive issue for both Russians and Chechens. Those who stir up tales of past offenses by either side are seen as undermining the stability in Chechnya that has come about because of the ongoing alliance between Putin and Kadyrov. The suspicious deaths of individuals (followed by their date of death) who fall into this category include:
· Anna Politkovskaya, October 2006. A prominent journalist and critic of the Kremlin, Politkovskaya was in the process of publishing a series condemning the government’s policy in Chechnya. She was shot in the head in her apartment building.
· Alexander Litvinenko, November 2006. Litvinenko was a former KGB agent who had defected to the United Kingdom and published books on the internal workings of Putin’s FSB networks, and he was critical of the new Russian state. He was poisoned with radioactive polonium-210.
· Ivan Safronov, March 2007. Safronov was a journalist who criticized the state of the Russian military and was accused of leaking military affairs to foreign parties. He allegedly committed suicide by jumping from the fifth floor of his apartment building, though some reports say a person behind him forced him out of the building.
· Oleg Zhukovsky, December 2007. Zhukovsky was an executive of the VTB bank, which at the time of his death was being taken over by the state so the Kremlin could handpick its senior officers to oversee many strategic state accounts. Zhukovsky allegedly performed the feat of committing suicide by being tied to a chair and thrown into his swimming pool, where he drowned.
· Arkady Patarkatsishvili, February 2008. A wealthy Georgian-Russian businessman, Patarkatsishvili was extensively involved in Georgian politics. Patarkatsishvili died in the United Kingdom of coronary complications that resembled a heart attack. His family and many in Georgia have accused the FSB of involvement, however, saying the FSB has many untraceable poisons at its disposal.
· Leonid Rozhetskin, March 2008. Rozhetskin was an international financier and lawyer who held stakes in strategic companies, like mobile phone giant MegaFon. He disappeared while in Latvia after losing Kremlin backing by selling his assets to multiple parties, including some government ministers who are former FSB agents.
· Paul Klebnikov, July 2008. The editor of Forbes’ Russian edition, Klebnikov was shot dead in Moscow as he was heading into a subway station. The driver of a stolen car that pulled out of a parking lot and drove toward Klebnikov fired four shots before fleeing the scene.
· Ruslan Yamadayev, September 2008. Yamadayev was a Chechen military leader and former member of the State Duma. He was shot in his Mercedes as it was stopped at a red light near the Kremlin in Moscow.
· Stanislav Markelov, January 2009. A prominent Russian lawyer who had prosecuted an army colonel convicted of murdering a Chechen woman, Markelov was shot dead along with a journalist in broad daylight on a Moscow street near the Kremlin. He was also involved in the case of Anna Politkovskaya.
Vienna, City of International Intrigue
Vienna has long been a key battleground for international disputes between competing countries’ security and intelligence operatives. No stranger to international intrigue and attacks, the Austrian capital has had a reputation for assassination plots, intelligence gathering and foreign operatives conducting missions against dissidents who thought they were safe living in a Western city in an otherwise peaceful country.
In one example of this tradition, Iranian agents linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security shot and killed three members of a Kurdish delegation conducting negotiations with the Iranian leadership in 1989. Similarly, many cases of espionage between the United States and the Soviet Union unfolded in Vienna, including the cases of Marine Sgt. Clayton Lonetree and Felix Block, who passed information to the Soviets when he was second-in-command at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna. The Israilov case is thus probably only the latest in a long tradition of foreign intrigue.
Austria’s central location between the former Warsaw Pact countries of Czechoslovakia and Hungary and NATO countries of Italy and West Germany, along with Vienna’s official neutrality, made Austria a natural Cold War battleground. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States all focused intelligence-gathering capabilities there. And as Cold War battle lines are redrawn with Russia’s resurgence, the significance of places like Vienna re-emerges. Considering that these activities only began to slacken less than 20 years ago, old intelligence networks could be put into operation again with relative ease.
The blurring of the line between Russian intelligence agents and organized crime that occurred during the 1990s means that Russia still has a considerable network around the world, though now, elements of this network also are engaged in criminal activities. This network must be considered when looking at cases like that of Israilov.
Significantly, Austria is home to the largest Chechen refugee population in Europe. An estimated 20,000 Chechens — not all of them legal residents — live in the Central European country; many of them fled the bloody Chechen wars with Russia. In general, ethnic organized criminal outfits flourish among immigrants or refugee populations because they can offer illegal immigrants services that they cannot get from the state. They also flourish there because they can use the immigrant community to operate with more secrecy. This is because many immigrant communities live apart from the indigenous population, often in separate neighborhoods, speak a different language and generally stick together in opposition to their host country’s police services. Additionally, family bonds (intensified when around strangers) strengthen ties within immigrant communities, allowing for the kind of secrecy that lets organized crime thrive.
The establishment of a strong Chechen presence in Austria, along with a pre-existing Russian presence, means that Chechnya and Russia have a long reach in the country. Considering the organized crime-FSB nexus, the increase in politically motivated murders of Russian dissidents and how Moscow most likely was pleased with Israilov’s demise, Russian assets in Vienna could well have been involved in the murder. While Russia is broadly suspected of killing dissidents abroad in recent years, Chechnya is not known to have carried out attacks in the European Union before — meaning the Israilov killing will send chills down the spines of exiled Chechen dissidents.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to http://www.stratfor.com/
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
The Sopranos - Season 4
I got through the last 2 episodes on Monday. As I usually mention every time I post about this, I still don't get the hype. I will say, however, that I do gather more appreciation for the series listening to the commentaries that accompany some of the episodes. The best are when David Chase, the creator of the series, does them. Not only does he give you trivia about where scenes are filmed, how they are filmed, who the extras in certain scenes are, he seems to give more insight into the what the characters are thinking, which is sometimes difficult for the normal viewer when they are speaking in their "coded" speak. He said a couple of interesting things in the final episode - that there were lots of complaints about the finale because not enough people got killed. As death or killings make a good cliffhanger. He also said you had to look at the first 4 seasons in very broad terms in relation to Tony. That in general they were about Tony the son (Season 1), Tony the brother (Season 2), Tony the child (Season 3) and Tony the father (Season 4). In reflection, that made a lot of sense, but perhaps I have the advantage since I'm able to watch them differently than someone who had to wait months between seasons.
The other thing he mentioned that I found interesting was the effort they went through to make Tony likable and a "hero", while at the same time knowing they had to keep showing him as the sociopathic mobster he is. That they had a very fine line to walk in that regard, because the hero in any tv series or movie has to be likable or someone you care about, even if they do horrible things and/or are a horrible (in certain aspects) person.
The one thing that stood out for me in Season 4 was what, so far at least, is the funniest scene of the entire series. I watched it several times and each time, I was laughing so hard I was crying. It occurs in the episode entitled, "The Strong, Silent Type" and is an intervention for Tony's nephew who has a heroin addiction. Just the thought of super-macho, emotional Italian mobster's trying to be"non-judgemental" in regards to anything makes me laugh - to put them in a situation like that, was just brilliant.
Only 2 more season's to go - I'm in the home stretch.
The other thing he mentioned that I found interesting was the effort they went through to make Tony likable and a "hero", while at the same time knowing they had to keep showing him as the sociopathic mobster he is. That they had a very fine line to walk in that regard, because the hero in any tv series or movie has to be likable or someone you care about, even if they do horrible things and/or are a horrible (in certain aspects) person.
The one thing that stood out for me in Season 4 was what, so far at least, is the funniest scene of the entire series. I watched it several times and each time, I was laughing so hard I was crying. It occurs in the episode entitled, "The Strong, Silent Type" and is an intervention for Tony's nephew who has a heroin addiction. Just the thought of super-macho, emotional Italian mobster's trying to be"non-judgemental" in regards to anything makes me laugh - to put them in a situation like that, was just brilliant.
Only 2 more season's to go - I'm in the home stretch.
New supply line deal reached
Appears President Obama solved one of his crises even before taking office. From Yahoo/AP:
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan – Russia and neighboring Central Asian nations have agreed to let supplies pass through their territory to American soldiers in Afghanistan, lessening Washington's dependence on dangerous routes through Pakistan, a top U.S. commander said Tuesday.
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan – Russia and neighboring Central Asian nations have agreed to let supplies pass through their territory to American soldiers in Afghanistan, lessening Washington's dependence on dangerous routes through Pakistan, a top U.S. commander said Tuesday.
Today
Today is the 48th anniversary of the luckiest day of my life. 49 years ago my mother got the phone call, “Congratulations, Betsy, you have a son.” Obviously, the adoption procedures were long since finalized. Dad and a neighbor (who was also my mom’s physician) were on the way to the hospital to pick me up, with Mom and her mother waiting at home.
Mom paced around the house while her mom tried to reduce expectations by reminding her that some infants are plain ugly and red. Mom continued to pace and could only think one thing, “I’m a new mother. I need to be clean. I need to be clean.”
So she went to the bathroom to take a shower. It was only after the water was rushing over her did she realize she was fully clothed.
Thanks, Mom and Dad.
Mom paced around the house while her mom tried to reduce expectations by reminding her that some infants are plain ugly and red. Mom continued to pace and could only think one thing, “I’m a new mother. I need to be clean. I need to be clean.”
So she went to the bathroom to take a shower. It was only after the water was rushing over her did she realize she was fully clothed.
Thanks, Mom and Dad.
Fox News has started already
According to one of their talking heads, Obama isn't President because of the botched oath (Justice Roberts fault, btw. Why did he go without notes for THIS of all oaths??). THAT didn't take long, did it?
This is interesting because ABC (the network I watched) had a discussion about when does the President become President about 30 minutes before the oath ceremony. What prompted this discussion was the fact that the inauguration was running 45 minutes or so behind schedule. According to the Constitutional scholars quoted by ABC, the President-elect becomes President at noon on January 20th, whether or not the oath has actually been taken by then.
This is interesting because ABC (the network I watched) had a discussion about when does the President become President about 30 minutes before the oath ceremony. What prompted this discussion was the fact that the inauguration was running 45 minutes or so behind schedule. According to the Constitutional scholars quoted by ABC, the President-elect becomes President at noon on January 20th, whether or not the oath has actually been taken by then.
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
The Inauguration
As the rather lonely right-wing nutcase of my office, I must say the mood here is something else. Free ‘que in the kitchen in 20 minutes for those who want to watch there. I don’t remember getting a free lunch for the Reagan funeral.
This is an email making its rounds today:
Last Official Act as President
In what he hoped would be the capstone to his eight years as President, George W. Bush today signed an executive order repealing the English language.
Scrawling his name on the official document, Mr. Bush said that in abolishing English he had vanquished his "greaterest enemy."
For Mr. Bush, the executive order represents the realization of a longstanding dream that began in 2001 when he declared an official War on Grammar.
The President followed up that declaration of war in 2003 when he signed an executive order cancelling the agreement between nouns and verbs.
Mr. Bush's decision to repeal the English language could complicate matters for his successor, President-elect Barack Obama, who is scheduled to deliver his inaugural address tomorrow, presumably in English.
But thoughts of Mr. Obama seemed far away during today's jubilant Oval Office ceremony, which Mr. Bush summed up in four words: "I can has legacy."
Mr. Bush's executive order also drew high praise from a fellow Republican, Gov. Sarah Palin of Alaska: "Being that the English language can and has been used in confusing and also too in harming ordinary Americans, knowing that it no longer can or will be used in doing that is something positive that this is doing also."
This is an email making its rounds today:
Last Official Act as President
In what he hoped would be the capstone to his eight years as President, George W. Bush today signed an executive order repealing the English language.
Scrawling his name on the official document, Mr. Bush said that in abolishing English he had vanquished his "greaterest enemy."
For Mr. Bush, the executive order represents the realization of a longstanding dream that began in 2001 when he declared an official War on Grammar.
The President followed up that declaration of war in 2003 when he signed an executive order cancelling the agreement between nouns and verbs.
Mr. Bush's decision to repeal the English language could complicate matters for his successor, President-elect Barack Obama, who is scheduled to deliver his inaugural address tomorrow, presumably in English.
But thoughts of Mr. Obama seemed far away during today's jubilant Oval Office ceremony, which Mr. Bush summed up in four words: "I can has legacy."
Mr. Bush's executive order also drew high praise from a fellow Republican, Gov. Sarah Palin of Alaska: "Being that the English language can and has been used in confusing and also too in harming ordinary Americans, knowing that it no longer can or will be used in doing that is something positive that this is doing also."
From the today in history gadget over there on the right...
28 years ago, minutes after RR was sworn in, the hostages of Iran were released.
Up at dawn for the dawning of a new era in our country's history
Not sure I can even grasp what the events of today truly represent. But I'm sure the networks will try their best to explain it to me. I tried watching CNN yesterday and I could only make it about 20 minutes. It was too over-the-top and too much. And today will only be worse. Whatever coverage of the events today that I will watch I'll do via C-SPAN.
Stratfor's Enter President Obama
Because they let me:
By George Friedman
U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will be sworn in on Tuesday as president of the United States. Candidate Obama said much about what he would do as president; now we will see what President Obama actually does. The most important issue Obama will face will be the economy, something he did not anticipate through most of his campaign. The first hundred days of his presidency thus will revolve around getting a stimulus package passed. But Obama also is now in the great game of global competition — and in that game, presidents rarely get to set the agenda.
The major challenge he faces is not Gaza; the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is not one any U.S. president intervenes in unless he wants to experience pain. As we have explained, that is an intractable conflict to which there is no real solution. Certainly, Obama will fight being drawn into mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his first hundred days in office. He undoubtedly will send the obligatory Middle East envoy, who will spend time with all the parties, make suitable speeches and extract meaningless concessions from all sides. This envoy will establish some sort of process to which everyone will cynically commit, knowing it will go nowhere. Such a mission is not involvement — it is the alternative to involvement, and the reason presidents appoint Middle East envoys. Obama can avoid the Gaza crisis, and he will do so.
Obama’s Two Unavoidable Crises
The two crises that cannot be avoided are Afghanistan and Russia. First, the situation in Afghanistan is tenuous for a number of reasons, and it is not a crisis that Obama can avoid decisions on. Obama has said publicly that he will decrease his commitments in Iraq and increase them in Afghanistan. He thus will have more troops fighting in Afghanistan. The second crisis emerged from a decision by Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine, and the resulting decline in natural gas deliveries to Europe. This one obviously does not affect the United States directly, but even after flows are restored, it affects the Europeans greatly. Obama therefo re comes into office with three interlocking issues: Afghanistan, Russia and Europe. In one sense, this is a single issue — and it is not one that will wait.
Obama clearly intends to follow Gen. David Petraeus’ lead in Afghanistan. The intention is to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, thereby intensifying pressure on the Taliban and opening the door for negotiations with the militant group or one of its factions. Ultimately, this would see the inclusion of the Taliban or Taliban elements in a coalition government. Petraeus pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is the likely strategy in Afghanistan.
But the situation in Afghanistan has been complicated by the situation in Pakistan. Roughly three-quarters of U.S. and NATO supplies bound for Afghanistan are delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi and trucked over the border to Afghanistan. Most fuel used by Western forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan and delivered via the same route. There are two crossing points, one near Afghanistan’s Kandahar province at Chaman, Pakistan, and the other through the Khyber Pass. The Taliban have attacked Western supply depots and convoys, and Pakistan itself closed the routes for several days, citing government operations a gainst radical Islamist forces.
Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has been complicated by tensions with India. The Indians have said that the individuals who carried out the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack were Pakistanis supported by elements in the Pakistani government. After Mumbai, India made demands of the Pakistanis. While the situation appears to have calmed, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations remains far from clear; anything from a change of policy in New Delhi to new terrorist attacks could see the situation escalate. The Pakistanis have made it clear that a heightened threat from India requires them to shift troops away from the Afghan border and toward the east; a small number of troops already has been shifted.
Apart from the direct impact this kind of Pakistani troop withdrawal would have on cross-border operations by the Taliban, such a move also would dramatically increase the vulnerability of NATO supply lines through Pakistan. Some supplies could be shipped in by aircraft, but the vast bulk of supplies — petroleum, ammunition, etc. — must come in via surface transit, either by truck, rail or ship. Western operations in Afghanistan simply cannot be supplied from the air alone. A cutoff of the supply lines across Pakistan would thus leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan in crisis. Because Washington can’t predict or control the future actions of Pakistan, of India or of terrorists, the United States must find an alternative to the routes through Pakistan.
When we look at a map, the two routes through Pakistan from Karachi are clearly the most logical to use. If those were closed — or even meaningfully degraded — the only other viable routes would be through the former Soviet Union.
- One route, along which a light load of fuel is currently transported, crosses the Caspian Sea. Fuel refined in Armenia is ferried across the Caspian to Turkmenistan (where a small amount of fuel is also refined), then shipped across Turkmenistan directly to Afghanistan and through a small spit of land in Uzbekistan. This route could be expanded to reach either the Black Sea through Georgia or the Mediterranean through Georgia and Turkey (though the additional use of Turkey would require a rail gauge switch). It is also not clear that transports native to the Caspian have sufficient capacity for this.
- Another route sidesteps the issues of both transport across the Caspian and the sensitivity of Georgia by crossing Russian territory above the Caspian. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (and likely at least a small corner of Turkmenistan) would connect the route to Afghanistan. There are options of connecting to the Black Sea or transiting to Europe through either Ukraine or Belarus.
- Iran could provide a potential alternative, but relations between Tehran and Washington would have to improve dramatically before such discussions could even begin — and time is short.
Many of the details still need to be worked out. But they are largely variations on the two main themes of either crossing the Caspian or transiting Russian territory above it.
Though the first route is already partially established for fuel, it is not clear how much additional capacity exists. To complicate matters further, Turkmen acquiescence is unlikely without Russian authorization, and Armenia remains strongly loyal to Moscow as well. While the current Georgian government might leap at the chance, the issue is obviously an extremely sensitive one for Moscow. (And with Russian forces positioned in Azerbaijan and the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has troops looming over both sides of the vulnerable route across Georgia.) The second option would require crossing Russian territory itself, with a number of options — from connecting to the Black Sea to transiting either Ukraine or Belarus to Europe, or connecting to the Baltic states.
Both routes involve countries of importance to Russia where Moscow has influence, regardless of whether those countries are friendly to it. This would give Russia ample opportunity to scuttle any such supply line at multiple points for reasons wholly unrelated to Afghanistan.
If the West were to opt for the first route, the Russians almost certainly would pressure Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan not to cooperate, and Turkey would find itself in a position it doesn’t want to be in — namely, caught between the United States and Russia. The diplomatic complexities of developing these routes not only involve the individual countries included, they also inevitably lead to the question of U.S.-Russian relations.
Even without crossing Russia, both of these two main options require Russian cooperation. The United States must develop the option of an alternative supply route to Pakistan, and in doing so, it must define its relationship with Russia. Seeking to work without Russian approval of a route crossing its “near abroad” will represent a challenge to Russia. But getting Russian approval will require a U.S. accommodation with the country.
The Russian Natural Gas Connection
One of Obama’s core arguments against the Bush administration was that it acted unilaterally rather than with allies. Specifically, Obama meant that the Bush administration alienated the Europeans, therefore failing to build a sustainable coalition for the war. By this logic, it follows that one of Obama’s first steps should be to reach out to Europe to help influence or pressure the Russians, given that NATO has troops in Afghanistan and Obama has said he intends to ask the Europeans for more help there.
The problem with this is that the Europeans are passing through a serious crisis with Russia, and that Germany in particular is involved in trying to manage that crisis. This problem relates to natural gas. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for about two-thirds of the natural gas it uses. The Russians traditionally have provided natural gas at a deep discount to former Soviet republics, primarily those countries Russia sees as allies, such as Belarus or Armenia. Ukraine had received discounted natural gas, too, until the 2004 Orange Revolution, when a pro-Western government came to power in Kiev. At that point, the Russians began demanding full payment. Given the subsequent rises in global energy prices, that left Ukraine in a terrible situation — which of course is exactly where Moscow wanted it.
The Russians cut off natural gas to Ukraine for a short period in January 2006, and for three weeks in 2009. Apart from leaving Ukraine desperate, the cutoff immediately affected the rest of Europe, because the natural gas that goes to Europe flows through Ukraine. This put the rest of Europe in a dangerous position, particularly in the face of bitterly cold weather in 2008-2009.
The Russians achieved several goals with this. First, they pressured Ukraine directly. Second, they forced many European states to deal with Moscow directly rather than through the European Union. Third, they created a situation in which European countries had to choose between supporting Ukraine and heating their own homes. And last, they drew Berlin in particular — since Germany is the most dependent of the major European states on Russian natural gas — into the position of working with the Russians to get Ukraine to agree to their terms. (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Germany last week to discuss this directly with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.)
The Germans already have made clear their opposition to expanding NATO to Ukraine and Georgia. Given their dependency on the Russians, the Germans are not going to be supporting the United States if Washington decides to challenge Russia over the supply route issue. In fact, the Germans — and many of the Europeans — are in no position to challenge Russia on anything, least of all on Afghanistan. Overall, the Europeans see themselves as having limited interests in the Afghan war, and many already are planning to reduce or withdraw troops for budgetary reasons.
It is therefore very difficult to see Obama recruiting the Europeans in any useful manner for a confrontation with Russia over access for American supplies to Afghanistan. Yet this is an issue he will have to address immediately.
The Price of Russian Cooperation
The Russians are prepared to help the Americans, however — and it is clear what they will want in return.
At minimum, Moscow will want a declaration that Washington will not press for the expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine, or for the deployment of military forces in non-NATO states on the Russian periphery — specifically, Ukraine and Georgia. At this point, such a declaration would be symbolic, since Germany and other European countries would block expansion anyway.
The Russians might also demand some sort of guarantee that NATO and the United States not place any large military formations or build any major military facilities in the former Soviet republics (now NATO member states) of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (A small rotating squadron of NATO fighters already patrols the skies over the Baltic states.) Given that there were intense anti-government riots in Latvia and Lithuania last week, the stability of these countries is in question. The Russians would certainly want to topple the pro-Western Baltic governments. And anything approaching a formal agreement between Russia and the United States on the matter could quickly destabilize the Baltics, in addition to very much weakening the NATO alliance.
Another demand the Russians probably will make — because they have in the past — is that the United States guarantee eventual withdrawal from any bases in Central Asia in return for Russian support for using those bases for the current Afghan campaign. (At present, the United States runs air logistics operations out of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.) The Russians do not want to see Central Asia become a U.S. sphere of influence as the result of an American military presence.
Other demands might relate to the proposed U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in the Czech Republic and Poland.
We expect the Russians to make variations on all these demands in exchange for cooperation in creating a supply line to Afghanistan. Simply put, the Russians will demand that the United States acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Americans will not want to concede this — or at least will want to make it implicit rather than explicit. But the Russians will want this explicit, because an explicit guarantee will create a crisis of confidence over U.S. guarantees in the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union, serving as a lever to draw these countries into the Russian orbit. U.S. acquiescence on the point potentially would have ripple effects in the rest of Europe, too.
Therefore, regardless of the global financial crisis, Obama has an immediate problem on his hands in Afghanistan. He has troops fighting there, and they must be supplied. The Pakistani supply line is no longer a sure thing. The only other options either directly challenge Russia (and ineffectively at that) or require Russian help. Russia’s price will be high, particularly because Washington’s European allies will not back a challenge to Russia in Georgia, and all options require Russian cooperation anyway. Obama’s plan to recruit the Europeans on behalf of American initiatives won’t work in this case. Obama does not want to start his administration with making a massive concession to Russia, but he cannot afford to leave U.S. forces in Afghanistan without supplies. He can hope that nothing happens in Pakistan, but that is up to the Taliban and other Islamist groups more than anyone else — and betting on their goodwill is not a good idea.
Whatever Obama is planning to do, he will have to deal with this problem fast, before Afghanistan becomes a crisis. And there are no good solutions. But unlike with the Israelis and Palestinians, Obama can’t solve this by sending a special envoy who appears to be doing something. He will have to make a very tough decision. Between the economy and this crisis, we will find out what kind of president Obama is.
And we will find out very soon.
Monday, January 19, 2009
I've been sucked onto Facebook by a childhood friend. It's like being at a whole-life reunion while sitting in your sweats in your living room.
Friday, January 16, 2009
Reich on TARP and Obama's team on stimulus
Robert Reich has a post at TPM discussing TARP:
He then goes on to recommend some prudent restrictions on the TARP II money. Two of his suggestions:
1) Don't buy stock in the banks. This one surprised me because I had believed that buying stock in the banks (so we have something to show for our "investment") was better than just handing them money, but Reich makes the case that such money simply disappears.
2) Limit compensation to execs to 50% of recent years since they've already been over-compensated for performance that was based on false premises and fraudulent assertions.
I'm trying to ignore the TARP and stimulus fiascoes because if I look directly at them, I get ill.
Here is a report from Obama's team on the predicted impact of the stimulus on jobs. The report contains this graph that compares predicted results to what would happen in the absence of Obama's stimulus plan:
At peak, that's a 1% difference. That doesn't seem like much to me. The endnotes point out that some estimates show the unemployment rate, sans stimulus, to be as high as 11%, so the peak difference might be more. Maybe the way to look at it is that over the period they show (we won't be back to 5% rates until 2013, stimulus or no), that difference affects a lot of lives and has a big economic impact. Tim Fernholz at Tapped has coherent thoughts about this jobs report and provides the link to the report.
It's difficult to make the case that the first $350 billion bailout of Wall Street -- so-called "TARP I" -- fulfilled its goals, unless one argues that the Street would have imploded without it, which is pretty much what Hank Paulson is saying these days. And since it's impossible to prove a counter-factual, especially when the Treasury was never clear about TARP I's goals to begin with, Paulson may have a point. But the easier and probably more correct argument is that American taxpayers wasted $350 billion.
He then goes on to recommend some prudent restrictions on the TARP II money. Two of his suggestions:
1) Don't buy stock in the banks. This one surprised me because I had believed that buying stock in the banks (so we have something to show for our "investment") was better than just handing them money, but Reich makes the case that such money simply disappears.
2) Limit compensation to execs to 50% of recent years since they've already been over-compensated for performance that was based on false premises and fraudulent assertions.
I'm trying to ignore the TARP and stimulus fiascoes because if I look directly at them, I get ill.
Here is a report from Obama's team on the predicted impact of the stimulus on jobs. The report contains this graph that compares predicted results to what would happen in the absence of Obama's stimulus plan:
At peak, that's a 1% difference. That doesn't seem like much to me. The endnotes point out that some estimates show the unemployment rate, sans stimulus, to be as high as 11%, so the peak difference might be more. Maybe the way to look at it is that over the period they show (we won't be back to 5% rates until 2013, stimulus or no), that difference affects a lot of lives and has a big economic impact. Tim Fernholz at Tapped has coherent thoughts about this jobs report and provides the link to the report.
Thursday, January 15, 2009
The pitch...
Heaven knows I've had my disagreements, especially in the second term, but this is the image I'll remember. From Ace.
Idol
Sure, just like succeeding in the entertainment industry, popularity is a component of the voting in Idol. But no one has won who can't sing. Tell me Kelly Clarkson can't sing (from the big band night in Season 1):
And sure some of the whacky ones are looking for 15 minutes. But some of these sad souls really do not know they can't sing.
And sure some of the whacky ones are looking for 15 minutes. But some of these sad souls really do not know they can't sing.
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
Mental illness
I've become convinced there is a particular form of mental illness in which its victim suffers from the delusion that he/she is a competent singer. Yes, I'm catching bits of Idol auditions tonight.
These economic times
Just a couple months ago, our firm was thinking about adding a secretary/paralegal. Since then, our biggest client, a Fortune 100 company, has demanded a rate freeze and a 20% discount for all of 2009. Our second biggest client has commanded that all our work cease for at least one month. So when we met this week, we decided we will not hire anyone after all and we will freeze our rates for all clients. In addition, we made a brutal decision about the 2008 bonus for our one current secretary/paralegal: we're giving her $0, nothing, nada, instead of our customary $10,000, based solely on economic conditions (not performance). (Let me just say in my own defense that I voted for well more than $0, but I was outvoted.)
The Wrestler
My Oscar movie Festival continued a day earlier as planned as yesterday I caught “The Wrestler”. I was a big Mickey Rourke fan starting with his small but impressive role in one of my all time favorite movies, “Body Heat”. In fact, I famously (in my circle of friends) predicted after seeing “Body Heat” that he would become a big star. He followed that up with great performances in “Diner”, “Rumble Fish”, “The Pope of Greenwich Village”, “9 ½ Weeks”, and “Angel Heart”. Then, his career and life began a long, downward spiral.
The story of how “The Wrestler” came to be a movie at all mirrors how Rourke came to play the lead. He really is as good as advertised in this. You can feel his aches and pains, you can feel his pride in what he does, you can feel his desire for wanting to get back into his daughters life, but knowing that he would find some way to mess that up as well. The film has a low budget feel about it, either by design or because the filmmakers had almost no money. It’s gritty, it’s grimy, it’s seedy – just as his life is. And the speech Rourke makes near the end of the film as he speaks to a wrestling event audience could very easily have been a speech about his personal life and career. There were also a couple of other incredible scenes that stayed with me – one with Rourke playing an old Nintendo game with a neighborhood kid and the other, Rourke sitting at a table at a wrestling legends signing event. This is not a feel-good movie and you knew, pretty early on, how the 3 major plot lines would end. But the journey getting there was enthralling.
Two other observations: (1) the movie is only showing at 1 theater here in DFW, an artsy-type theater near SMU. I went to the earliest showing (1:30) and it was packed. Old, young, men, women, but no kids and no talking even before the movie began. And when the lights came up, the common word or phrase you heard as….”intense”…”wow, that was pretty intense”….etc. (2) Marisa Tomei has also gotten a lot of hype and buzz with her role as a quasi love-interest. I’m not saying she wasn’t good, but I was wondering if the buzz had more to do with how great she looks. You know this because for the vast majority of her scenes, she isn’t wearing much. For a 40-something actress, doing numerous topless and almost nude dance scenes might have more to do with her buzz.
All-in-all a tremendous performance by Rourke. A must-see for any fan of his or if you enjoy seeing an actor redeeming himself after years of being at the bottom of the heap, both personally and professionally. Be prepared for violence and blood, much of which is rumored to be actually Rourke.
The story of how “The Wrestler” came to be a movie at all mirrors how Rourke came to play the lead. He really is as good as advertised in this. You can feel his aches and pains, you can feel his pride in what he does, you can feel his desire for wanting to get back into his daughters life, but knowing that he would find some way to mess that up as well. The film has a low budget feel about it, either by design or because the filmmakers had almost no money. It’s gritty, it’s grimy, it’s seedy – just as his life is. And the speech Rourke makes near the end of the film as he speaks to a wrestling event audience could very easily have been a speech about his personal life and career. There were also a couple of other incredible scenes that stayed with me – one with Rourke playing an old Nintendo game with a neighborhood kid and the other, Rourke sitting at a table at a wrestling legends signing event. This is not a feel-good movie and you knew, pretty early on, how the 3 major plot lines would end. But the journey getting there was enthralling.
Two other observations: (1) the movie is only showing at 1 theater here in DFW, an artsy-type theater near SMU. I went to the earliest showing (1:30) and it was packed. Old, young, men, women, but no kids and no talking even before the movie began. And when the lights came up, the common word or phrase you heard as….”intense”…”wow, that was pretty intense”….etc. (2) Marisa Tomei has also gotten a lot of hype and buzz with her role as a quasi love-interest. I’m not saying she wasn’t good, but I was wondering if the buzz had more to do with how great she looks. You know this because for the vast majority of her scenes, she isn’t wearing much. For a 40-something actress, doing numerous topless and almost nude dance scenes might have more to do with her buzz.
All-in-all a tremendous performance by Rourke. A must-see for any fan of his or if you enjoy seeing an actor redeeming himself after years of being at the bottom of the heap, both personally and professionally. Be prepared for violence and blood, much of which is rumored to be actually Rourke.
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
Fruitcake?
As part of the extensive traveling I must endure as an attorney, Thursday takes me to the metropolis of Corsicana, Texas. Home of the Collin Street Bakery, maker of the world famous DeLuxe Fruitcake. If you’ve had a fruitcake, it likely came from CSB.
Next Tuesday a Mountaintop Moment
William Bennett and John Cribb at Culture11:
The election of Barack Obama confirms a new self-evident truth: that there is no ceiling to achievement in America based on race. Yes, of course, there is still racism in America. But there are no more viable excuses based simply on race. A black man or woman can become President in America — or anything else he or she wants to be. The recipe, as it largely was for Barack Obama, is to take a serious education seriously, to work hard, and to maintain a strong family ethic. The message to non-black America is that the Huxtables are not just a fictional drama or sitcom of the past; a version of the Huxtables is now about to run Washington with the paterfamilias leading the free world. A successful, upper-middle-class black family now serves as a role model for the success of the rest of black America and the rest of non-black America, too.
As Ta-Nehisi Coates put it in Time Magazine, "the most famous black man in America isn't dribbling a ball or clutching a microphone. He has no prison record. He has not built a career on four-letter words." Indeed. And, now we can all clearly see what we may have been blind to in the past: qualifications or demerits based on skin color, and not character, are the new fiction in America. Racial prejudice should die in the rest of America as it died at the ballot boxes across America last year — as should an ethic of non- or low-achievement based on excuses and low expectations.
The election of Barack Obama confirms a new self-evident truth: that there is no ceiling to achievement in America based on race. Yes, of course, there is still racism in America. But there are no more viable excuses based simply on race. A black man or woman can become President in America — or anything else he or she wants to be. The recipe, as it largely was for Barack Obama, is to take a serious education seriously, to work hard, and to maintain a strong family ethic. The message to non-black America is that the Huxtables are not just a fictional drama or sitcom of the past; a version of the Huxtables is now about to run Washington with the paterfamilias leading the free world. A successful, upper-middle-class black family now serves as a role model for the success of the rest of black America and the rest of non-black America, too.
As Ta-Nehisi Coates put it in Time Magazine, "the most famous black man in America isn't dribbling a ball or clutching a microphone. He has no prison record. He has not built a career on four-letter words." Indeed. And, now we can all clearly see what we may have been blind to in the past: qualifications or demerits based on skin color, and not character, are the new fiction in America. Racial prejudice should die in the rest of America as it died at the ballot boxes across America last year — as should an ethic of non- or low-achievement based on excuses and low expectations.
Monday, January 12, 2009
My annual Oscar nominated movie festival
Every year, I try to make sure I see every movie nominated for Best Picture. I'm starting a little early this year, as the nominations haven't been released yet. Yesterday, C and I went to see "Slumdog Millionaire". I had heard about this movie months ago and due to all of our travels around the holidays, this past weekend was the first chance we've had to go to the movies. The premise of this movie is pretty cool - a young boy from the slums (and an American vision of slum doesn't do justice to what a slum in India is) of Mumbai is a contestant on the Indian version of "Who Wants to be A Millionaire". The movie cuts back and forth between present time as he is asked questions and the past as he uses his life experiences in order to answer the questions. The authorities (and host of the program) believe he is cheating and he has to explain how he knew the answers. I found his explanations very plausible, except for one concerning a Hindu God. And his reason for being on the program isn't for the money, but to find the girl he loves, who he believes will be watching the program. The movie was filmed in India and the poverty and daily life struggle of the people who live in the slums is mind-boggling. There are some very uncomfortable scenes from his childhood, one in particular that was difficult to watch.
And perhaps it's because I'm a movie buff, but I knew how the last question would work itself out and in fact, what the last question would be.
The acting was great (each of the 3 main characters had 3 different aged people playing them), the photography captured present day India as well as I thought "Ghandi" captured India of that time and as a big fan of the music of Bollywood (India's Hollywood that produces vastly more movies per year as Hollywood does), the score was fantastic. This is a feel-good movie that most of the time doesn't have a feel-good vibe to it.
UPDATE: "Slumdog Millionaire" won 3 Golden Globes last night for Best Score, Best Screenplay and Best Drama. It is the odds-on favorite now to win the Best Picture Oscar.
Next on my list is "The Wrestler", which I plan to see on Wednesday. It stars Mickey Rourke, who from all I've read and heard is brilliant in this. Also stars Marisa Tomei who is also supposed to be excellent. Again, not a feel-good movie, but the buzz for this film is off-the-charts.
And perhaps it's because I'm a movie buff, but I knew how the last question would work itself out and in fact, what the last question would be.
The acting was great (each of the 3 main characters had 3 different aged people playing them), the photography captured present day India as well as I thought "Ghandi" captured India of that time and as a big fan of the music of Bollywood (India's Hollywood that produces vastly more movies per year as Hollywood does), the score was fantastic. This is a feel-good movie that most of the time doesn't have a feel-good vibe to it.
UPDATE: "Slumdog Millionaire" won 3 Golden Globes last night for Best Score, Best Screenplay and Best Drama. It is the odds-on favorite now to win the Best Picture Oscar.
Next on my list is "The Wrestler", which I plan to see on Wednesday. It stars Mickey Rourke, who from all I've read and heard is brilliant in this. Also stars Marisa Tomei who is also supposed to be excellent. Again, not a feel-good movie, but the buzz for this film is off-the-charts.
Sunday, January 11, 2009
How cool/embarrassing is that II or Funnier Coincidence
Minutes after waking me up, Fred Burton wrote to me to assuage my suspicions of an imposter commenter on Scooter's post.
Funny coincidence
I just woke up to Fred Burton's voice. NPR was interviewing him about kidnappings in Mexico, so my radio alarm made him the first thing I heard this morning.
Saturday, January 10, 2009
Barred owl
One of my favorite things about the dog park lately is seeing this (or some) owl on occasion. I'd heard about him/her for a year, but finally saw him for the first time a few weeks ago and now see him almost every time I go. He/she has a couple typical spots. This is a barred owl. Today I saw two of these owls in close proximity and heard them calling and responding to each other. Amazing. Part of their call is a "who who" like a stereotype of an owl. One was quite a bit larger than the other, so I think they're opposite sex and may be or may become a mating pair. I'm hoping for baby owls in April, though I'll probably not be able to spot them. Seem like a dog park would be a dangerous place to fledge.
I took this photo with my husband's camera and couldn't figure out how to work the zoom, so you'll have to take my word for it that there's an owl there.
I'll try to get a better photo some time.
I took this photo with my husband's camera and couldn't figure out how to work the zoom, so you'll have to take my word for it that there's an owl there.
I'll try to get a better photo some time.
Friday, January 09, 2009
Stephanie the Honda girl...
Honda Girl is right there with Victor Davis Hanson:
I never bought a foreign or even a new car until 1991 when I first sinned at 38, and got a cut-rate, entry-level 4-cylinder Mazda MPV van for the five of us ($15,100/five years at 5%, and a $1000 down). (It ran wonderfully for 130,000 miles without a glitch).
That said, over the subsequent years and in subsequent real guilt (My late B-29-flying Dad wouldn’t buy Japanese), I did atonement and bought my two kids two Chevy-S-10s. I got my other daughter a Chevy Malibu. In the 1990s I drove only Dodge Pick-ups—a little Ram D-50 and then a Dakota.
Then I noticed the following: Malibu—6 brake jobs, alternator out twice, air conditioning never worked right after 5,000 miles. The two S-10s: alternators went out, fuel line problems. Dodge pick-ups: one broke down late at night on California’s empty West Side due to ignition and chronic electrical problems, and then again during a rain storm in the Sierra. (on a high pass on a curve). The other’s timing belt quit at 40,000 miles (stuck while driving on the coast for two days); the head gasket blew at 85,000 miles (stuck in Hollister).
Then in 2004 I sinned again (mea culpa, Pater care, mea magna culpa!) and borrowed and bought a Honda Accord (now 110K miles, still no problems), then yet again with a 2006 Civic for my daughter (60K no problems), and, yes, still more, with a 2005 Honda CRV for my wife (70K, battery once went dead).
(I used to have an Accord myself and currently drive that Dakota...63k with only oil, wiper blade and tire changes.)
I never bought a foreign or even a new car until 1991 when I first sinned at 38, and got a cut-rate, entry-level 4-cylinder Mazda MPV van for the five of us ($15,100/five years at 5%, and a $1000 down). (It ran wonderfully for 130,000 miles without a glitch).
That said, over the subsequent years and in subsequent real guilt (My late B-29-flying Dad wouldn’t buy Japanese), I did atonement and bought my two kids two Chevy-S-10s. I got my other daughter a Chevy Malibu. In the 1990s I drove only Dodge Pick-ups—a little Ram D-50 and then a Dakota.
Then I noticed the following: Malibu—6 brake jobs, alternator out twice, air conditioning never worked right after 5,000 miles. The two S-10s: alternators went out, fuel line problems. Dodge pick-ups: one broke down late at night on California’s empty West Side due to ignition and chronic electrical problems, and then again during a rain storm in the Sierra. (on a high pass on a curve). The other’s timing belt quit at 40,000 miles (stuck while driving on the coast for two days); the head gasket blew at 85,000 miles (stuck in Hollister).
Then in 2004 I sinned again (mea culpa, Pater care, mea magna culpa!) and borrowed and bought a Honda Accord (now 110K miles, still no problems), then yet again with a 2006 Civic for my daughter (60K no problems), and, yes, still more, with a 2005 Honda CRV for my wife (70K, battery once went dead).
(I used to have an Accord myself and currently drive that Dakota...63k with only oil, wiper blade and tire changes.)
Why I went to the Univeristy of Arkansas
I decided to reply this way, as I felt the comment section would be inappropriate for such a long winded answer.
Some history. Both of my parents are from the same small town in Arkansas. My grand-parents and great-grandparents both lived their whole lives in the same town. I had many aunts, uncles, cousins in the same town. All through my childhood, we spent almost as much time in Arkansas as we did in Tulsa or Houston. As with most Arkansans, all the members of my family were HUGE Razorback fans, even though none of them went there, let alone attended college. Only my father and one of his sisters ever went to college.
I always "knew" that is where I would go. My father, somewhat teasingly, always told me that I could to college anywhere I wanted, but he would only pay for Arkansas. By the time I got to college age, I was ready to get away from home. My thinking was that Arkansas was far enough away to be away, but close enough to my grandparents (2 1/2 hours) and I would see my parents when the made their numerous trips back home. Arkansas was , and is, a small school even though it is a state school (when I attended, 15,000 undergrads and only slightly higher now). I liked the small class sizes, the small but beautiful campus, the area of NW Arkansas and, of course, I was totally indoctrinated into the whole Razorback sports hysteria. I had gone to my first Razorback football game when I was 2 months old and had been attending or listening to games my whole life.
It's too bad that I wasn't exactly the best student - had I been, my experience would have been even better than it was.
Some history. Both of my parents are from the same small town in Arkansas. My grand-parents and great-grandparents both lived their whole lives in the same town. I had many aunts, uncles, cousins in the same town. All through my childhood, we spent almost as much time in Arkansas as we did in Tulsa or Houston. As with most Arkansans, all the members of my family were HUGE Razorback fans, even though none of them went there, let alone attended college. Only my father and one of his sisters ever went to college.
I always "knew" that is where I would go. My father, somewhat teasingly, always told me that I could to college anywhere I wanted, but he would only pay for Arkansas. By the time I got to college age, I was ready to get away from home. My thinking was that Arkansas was far enough away to be away, but close enough to my grandparents (2 1/2 hours) and I would see my parents when the made their numerous trips back home. Arkansas was , and is, a small school even though it is a state school (when I attended, 15,000 undergrads and only slightly higher now). I liked the small class sizes, the small but beautiful campus, the area of NW Arkansas and, of course, I was totally indoctrinated into the whole Razorback sports hysteria. I had gone to my first Razorback football game when I was 2 months old and had been attending or listening to games my whole life.
It's too bad that I wasn't exactly the best student - had I been, my experience would have been even better than it was.
Fred Burton’s Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent
Finished it last night while others watched the Gators beat the Paperclips.
I’ve been posting the Stratfor columns for a while now and Fred Burton is their vp for counter-terrrorism and corproate security. He was formerly deputy chief of the DSS. I didn’t really even know that the DSS was until I read the book even though I’ve met him a couple of times at speaking engagements (his, not mine…who wants to come hear a dry lawyer talk to a bunch of contractors about liens?).
It is the Defense Security Service. It is a federal agency under the State Department which operates CIA/FBI/Secret Service-like agency for the State Department. Lots of security work for our embassies, ambassadors and other diplomats abroad and in charge of protecting foreign dignitaries while here.
Update. That link I posted for DSS may have been wrong. It's parent organization, the DS is here.
There is a video about the book which I haven’t viewed but can be seen here.
It is written in style a counter-terrorism agent would employ along with the help of competent editors. A few too many references to the “Dark World” in which he operated for my taste.
He served under Reagan, Bush the Elder and Clinton. Interesting insights into several things: how the counter-terrorism operation used to work and how they work today, Arms for Hostages/Iran/Contra, guarding Arafat when it was once one’s job to get him, to Burton’s role in the capture of what has to be at least one the top five pre-9/11 terrorists.
Update: How embarrassing. Correction from the author: Diplomatic Security Service.
I’ve been posting the Stratfor columns for a while now and Fred Burton is their vp for counter-terrrorism and corproate security. He was formerly deputy chief of the DSS. I didn’t really even know that the DSS was until I read the book even though I’ve met him a couple of times at speaking engagements (his, not mine…who wants to come hear a dry lawyer talk to a bunch of contractors about liens?).
It is the Defense Security Service. It is a federal agency under the State Department which operates CIA/FBI/Secret Service-like agency for the State Department. Lots of security work for our embassies, ambassadors and other diplomats abroad and in charge of protecting foreign dignitaries while here.
Update. That link I posted for DSS may have been wrong. It's parent organization, the DS is here.
There is a video about the book which I haven’t viewed but can be seen here.
It is written in style a counter-terrorism agent would employ along with the help of competent editors. A few too many references to the “Dark World” in which he operated for my taste.
He served under Reagan, Bush the Elder and Clinton. Interesting insights into several things: how the counter-terrorism operation used to work and how they work today, Arms for Hostages/Iran/Contra, guarding Arafat when it was once one’s job to get him, to Burton’s role in the capture of what has to be at least one the top five pre-9/11 terrorists.
Update: How embarrassing. Correction from the author: Diplomatic Security Service.
National champion from the SEC...again
I was really torn last night watching the BCS National Championship game. Normally, I would obviously be rooting for the SEC team. However, I hate Florida. When you follow the SEC week-to-week as I do, you get force-fed Tim Tebow. I know he is a great person and a great player, but he seems TOO good, TOO perfect and his hype is unreal. Part of it, I admit, is being upset that he won the Heisman Trophy 2 years ago when I felt Darren McFadden of my beloved Arkansas Razorbacks should have. I've been to a game at Florida and their fans are arrogant as hell and just rub me the wrong way.
As for OU, I hate them as well. Never liked Bob Stoops, never liked Barry Switzer (even though he was an Arkansas boy and alum), never liked their fans, living here in DFW you have to listen and read about how great they are and how great the Big 12 is. Even though I was born in Oklahoma and lived there through 3rd grade, I never had a connection to OU. When they played Nebraska, I always rooted for Nebraska.
In the end, I wanted Florida to win, but look bad doing it. And I wanted the SEC to once again prove their dominance. 3 years in a row now the national champion has been from the SEC. I would love to see a Florida-USC matchup however, even though in that case I would be for USC. That being said....
S-E-C... S-E-C .... S-E-C!!!
As for OU, I hate them as well. Never liked Bob Stoops, never liked Barry Switzer (even though he was an Arkansas boy and alum), never liked their fans, living here in DFW you have to listen and read about how great they are and how great the Big 12 is. Even though I was born in Oklahoma and lived there through 3rd grade, I never had a connection to OU. When they played Nebraska, I always rooted for Nebraska.
In the end, I wanted Florida to win, but look bad doing it. And I wanted the SEC to once again prove their dominance. 3 years in a row now the national champion has been from the SEC. I would love to see a Florida-USC matchup however, even though in that case I would be for USC. That being said....
S-E-C... S-E-C .... S-E-C!!!
Thursday, January 08, 2009
George Will on the GMAC mess
From JWR:
GMAC is known as the "financing affiliate" of General Motors. But Cerberus, the huge private equity firm that owns 80.1 percent of Chrysler, also owned 51 percent of GMAC until GMAC got the government to baptize it as a bank holding company. That transformation supposedly was necessary to make GMAC eligible for a place at the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) trough — although GM itself already has a place there, as does Chrysler. Anyway, the infusion of TARP dollars — 6 billion of them — diluted Cerberus's GMAC ownership to at most 33 percent, but that diminution seems a small price for Cerberus to pay for a second bite from the bailout apple.
Washington sternly said that it would allow GMAC to become a bank holding company only if GMAC managed to increase its capital to $30 billion. When GMAC fell far short of that goal, Washington supplied some of the shortfall. Immediately after GMAC became eligible for TARP money, GM reduced to zero the interest rate — for up to 60 months — on certain models. This, of course, penalizes GM competitors, including Toyota, Honda and other "transplants" whose cars are made in America by Americans for Americans, and Ford, which does not have the freedom of maneuver conferred by TARP money because Ford is not taking any.
GMAC is known as the "financing affiliate" of General Motors. But Cerberus, the huge private equity firm that owns 80.1 percent of Chrysler, also owned 51 percent of GMAC until GMAC got the government to baptize it as a bank holding company. That transformation supposedly was necessary to make GMAC eligible for a place at the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) trough — although GM itself already has a place there, as does Chrysler. Anyway, the infusion of TARP dollars — 6 billion of them — diluted Cerberus's GMAC ownership to at most 33 percent, but that diminution seems a small price for Cerberus to pay for a second bite from the bailout apple.
Washington sternly said that it would allow GMAC to become a bank holding company only if GMAC managed to increase its capital to $30 billion. When GMAC fell far short of that goal, Washington supplied some of the shortfall. Immediately after GMAC became eligible for TARP money, GM reduced to zero the interest rate — for up to 60 months — on certain models. This, of course, penalizes GM competitors, including Toyota, Honda and other "transplants" whose cars are made in America by Americans for Americans, and Ford, which does not have the freedom of maneuver conferred by TARP money because Ford is not taking any.
Stratfor on Israel/Hamas
Because Stratfor lets me:
Israel is now in the 13th day of carrying out Operation Cast Lead against the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has been the de facto ruler ever since it seized control of the territory in a June 2007 coup. The Israeli campaign, whose primary military aim is to neutralize Hamas' ability to carry out rocket attacks against Israel, has led to the reported deaths of more than 560 Palestinians; the number of wounded is approaching the 3,000 mark.
The reaction from the Arab world has been mixed. On the one hand, a look at the so-called Arab street will reveal an angry scene of chanting protesters, burning flags and embassy attacks in protest of Israel's actions. The principal Arab regimes, however, have either kept quiet or publicly condemned Hamas for the crisis — while privately often expressing their support for Israel's bid to weaken the radical Palestinian group.
Despite the much-hyped Arab nationalist solidarity often cited in the name of Palestine, most Arab regimes actually have little love for the Palestinians. While these countries like keeping the Palestinian issue alive for domestic consumption and as a tool to pressure Israel and the West when the need arises, in actuality, they tend to view Palestinian refugees — and more Palestinian radical groups like Hamas — as a threat to the stability of their regimes.
One such Arab country is Saudi Arabia. Given its financial power and its shared religious underpinnings with Hamas, Riyadh traditionally has backed the radical Palestinian group. The kingdom backed a variety of Islamist political forces during the 1960s and 1970s in a bid to undercut secular Nasserite Arab nationalist forces, which threatened Saudi Arabia's regional status. But 9/11, which stemmed in part from Saudi support for the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, opened Riyadh's eyes to the danger of supporting militant Islamism.
Thus, while Saudi Arabia continued to support many of the same Palestinian groups, it also started whistling a more moderate tune in its domestic and foreign policies. As part of this moderate drive, in 2002 King Abdullah offered Israel a comprehensive peace treaty whereby Arab states would normalize ties with the Jewish state in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders. Though Israel rejected the offer, the proposal itself clearly conflicted with Hamas' manifesto, which calls for Israel's destruction. The post-9/11 world also created new problems for one of Hamas' sources of regular funding — wealthy Gulf Arabs — who grew increasingly wary of turning up on the radars of Western security and intelligence agencies as fund transfers from the Gulf came under closer scrutiny.
Meanwhile, Egypt, which regularly mediates Hamas-Israel and Hamas-Fatah matters, thus far has been the most vocal in its opposition to Hamas during the latest Israeli military offensive. Cairo has even gone as far as blaming Hamas for provoking the conflict. Though Egypt's stance has earned it a number of attacks on its embassies in the Arab world and condemnations in major Arab editorial pages, Cairo has a core strategic interest in ensuring that Hamas remains boxed in. The secular government of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is already preparing for a shaky leadership transition, which is bound to be exploited by the country's largest opposition movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
The MB, from which Hamas emerged, maintains links with the Hamas leadership. Egypt's powerful security apparatus has kept the MB in check, but the Egyptian group has steadily built up support among Egypt's lower and middle classes, which have grown disillusioned with the soaring rate of unemployment and lack of economic prospects in Egypt. The sight of Muslim Brotherhood activists leading protests in Egypt in the name of Hamas is thus quite disconcerting for the Mubarak regime. The Egyptians also are fearful that Gaza could become a haven for Salafist jihadist groups that could collaborate with Egypt's own jihadist node the longer Gaza remains in disarray under Hamas rule.
Of the Arab states, Jordan has the most to lose from a group like Hamas. More than three-fourths of the Hashemite monarchy's people claim Palestinian origins. The kingdom itself is a weak, poor state that historically has relied on the United Kingdom, Israel and the United States for its survival. Among all Arab governments, Amman has had the longest and closest relationship with Israel — even before it concluded a formal peace treaty with Israel in 1994. In 1970, Jordan waged war against Fatah when the group posed a threat to the kingdom's security; it also threw out Hamas in 1999 after fears that the group posed a similar threat to the stability of the kingdom. Like Egypt, Jordan also has a vibrant MB, which has closer ties to Hamas than its Egyptian counterpart. As far as Amman is concerned, therefore, the harder Israel hits Hamas, the better.
Finally, Syria is in a more complex position than these other four Arab states. The Alawite-Baathist regime in Syria has long been a pariah in the Arab world because of its support for Shiite Iran and for their mutual militant proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah. But ever since the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Syrians have been charting a different course, looking for ways to break free from diplomatic isolation and to reach some sort of understanding with the Israelis.
For the Syrians, support for Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and several other radical Palestinian outfits provides tools of leverage to use in negotiating a settlement with Israel. Any deal between the Syrians and the Israelis would thus involve Damascus sacrificing militant proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas in return for key concessions in Lebanon — where Syria's core geopolitical interests lie — and in the disputed Golan Heights. While the Israeli-Syrian peace talks remain in flux, Syria's lukewarm reaction to the Israeli offensive and restraint (thus far) from criticizing the more moderate Arab regimes' lack of response suggests Damascus may be looking to exploit the Gaza offensive to improve its relations in the Arab world and reinvigorate its talks with Israel. And the more da mage Israel does to Hamas now, the easier it will be for Damascus to crack down on Hamas should the need arise.
With Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria taking into account their own interests when dealing with the Palestinians, ironically, the most reliable patron Sunni Hamas has had in recent years is Iran, the Sunni Arab world's principal Shiite rival. Several key developments have made Hamas' gradual shift toward Iran possible:
1. Saudi Arabia's post-9/11 move into the moderate camp — previously dominated by Egypt and Jordan, two states that have diplomatic relations with Israel.
2. The collapse of Baathist Iraq and the resulting rise of Shiite power in the region.
3. The 2004 Iranian parliamentary elections that put Iran's ultraconservatives in power and the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose public anti-Israeli views resonated with Hamas at a time when other Arab states had grown more moderate.
4. The 2006 Palestinian elections, in which Hamas defeated its secular rival, Fatah, by a landslide. When endowed with the responsibility of running an unrecognized government, Hamas floundered between its goals of dominating the Palestinian political landscape and continuing to call for the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamist state. The Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, had hoped that the electoral victory would lead Hamas to moderate its stance, but Iran encouraged Hamas to adhere to its radical agenda. As the West increasingly isolated the Hamas-led government, the group shifted more toward the Iranian position, which more closely meshed with its original mandate.
5. The 2006 summer military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, in which Iranian-backed Hezbollah symbolically defeated the Jewish state. Hezbollah's ability to withstand the Israeli military onslaught gave confidence to Hamas that it could emulate the Lebanese Shiite movement — which, like Hamas, was both a political party and an armed paramilitary organization. Similar to their reaction to the current Gaza offensive, the principal Arab states condemned Hezbollah for provoking Israel and grew terrified at the outpouring of support for the Shiite militant group from their own populations. Hezbollah-Hamas collaboration in training, arms-procurement and funding intensified, and almost certainly has played a decisive role in equipping Hamas with 122mm BM-21 Grad artillery rockets and larger Iranian-made 240mm Fajr-3 rockets — and potentially even a modest anti-armor capability.
6. The June 2007 Hamas coup against Fatah in the Gaza Strip, which caused a serious strain in relations between Egypt and Hamas. The resulting blockade on Gaza put Egypt in an extremely uncomfortable position, in which it had to crack down on the Gaza border, thus giving the MB an excuse to rally opposition against Cairo. Egypt was already uncomfortable with Hamas' electoral victory, but it could not tolerate the group's emergence as the unchallenged power in Gaza.
7. Syria's decision to go public with peace talks with Israel. As soon as it became clear that Syria was getting serious about such negotiations, alarm bells went off within groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which now had to deal with the fear that Damascus could sell them out at any time as part of a deal with the Israelis.
Hamas' relations with the Arab states already were souring; its warming relationship with Iran has proved the coup de grace. Mubarak said it best when he recently remarked that the situation in the Gaza Strip "has led to Egypt, in practice, having a border with Iran." In other words, Hamas has allowed Iranian influence to come far too close for the Arab states' comfort.
In many ways, the falling-out between Hamas and the Arab regimes is not surprising. The decline of Nasserism in the late 1960s essentially meant the death of Arab nationalism. Even before then, the Arab states put their respective national interests ahead of any devotion to pan-Arab nationalism that would have translated into support for the Palestinian cause. As Islamism gradually came to replace Arab nationalism as a political force throughout the region, the Arab regimes became even more concerned about stability at home, given the very real threat of a religious challenge to their rule. While these states worked to suppress radical Islamist elements that had taken root in their countries, the Arab governments caught wind of Tehran's attempts to adopt the region's radical Islamist trend to create a geopolitical space for Iran in the Arab Middle East. As a result, the Arab-Persian struggle became one of the key drivers that has turned the Arab states against Hamas.
For each of these Arab states, Hamas represents a force that could stir the social pot at home — either by creating a backlash against the regimes for their ties to Israel and their perceived failure to aid the Palestinians, or by emboldening democratic Islamist movements in the region that could threaten the stability of both republican regimes and monarchies. With somewhat limited options to contain Iranian expansion in the region, the Arab states ironically are looking to Israel to ensure that Hamas remains boxed in. So, while on the surface it may seem that the entire Arab world is convulsing with anger at Israel's offensive against Hamas, a closer look reveals that the view from the Arab palace is quite different from the view on the Arab street.
Israel is now in the 13th day of carrying out Operation Cast Lead against the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas has been the de facto ruler ever since it seized control of the territory in a June 2007 coup. The Israeli campaign, whose primary military aim is to neutralize Hamas' ability to carry out rocket attacks against Israel, has led to the reported deaths of more than 560 Palestinians; the number of wounded is approaching the 3,000 mark.
The reaction from the Arab world has been mixed. On the one hand, a look at the so-called Arab street will reveal an angry scene of chanting protesters, burning flags and embassy attacks in protest of Israel's actions. The principal Arab regimes, however, have either kept quiet or publicly condemned Hamas for the crisis — while privately often expressing their support for Israel's bid to weaken the radical Palestinian group.
Despite the much-hyped Arab nationalist solidarity often cited in the name of Palestine, most Arab regimes actually have little love for the Palestinians. While these countries like keeping the Palestinian issue alive for domestic consumption and as a tool to pressure Israel and the West when the need arises, in actuality, they tend to view Palestinian refugees — and more Palestinian radical groups like Hamas — as a threat to the stability of their regimes.
One such Arab country is Saudi Arabia. Given its financial power and its shared religious underpinnings with Hamas, Riyadh traditionally has backed the radical Palestinian group. The kingdom backed a variety of Islamist political forces during the 1960s and 1970s in a bid to undercut secular Nasserite Arab nationalist forces, which threatened Saudi Arabia's regional status. But 9/11, which stemmed in part from Saudi support for the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, opened Riyadh's eyes to the danger of supporting militant Islamism.
Thus, while Saudi Arabia continued to support many of the same Palestinian groups, it also started whistling a more moderate tune in its domestic and foreign policies. As part of this moderate drive, in 2002 King Abdullah offered Israel a comprehensive peace treaty whereby Arab states would normalize ties with the Jewish state in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders. Though Israel rejected the offer, the proposal itself clearly conflicted with Hamas' manifesto, which calls for Israel's destruction. The post-9/11 world also created new problems for one of Hamas' sources of regular funding — wealthy Gulf Arabs — who grew increasingly wary of turning up on the radars of Western security and intelligence agencies as fund transfers from the Gulf came under closer scrutiny.
Meanwhile, Egypt, which regularly mediates Hamas-Israel and Hamas-Fatah matters, thus far has been the most vocal in its opposition to Hamas during the latest Israeli military offensive. Cairo has even gone as far as blaming Hamas for provoking the conflict. Though Egypt's stance has earned it a number of attacks on its embassies in the Arab world and condemnations in major Arab editorial pages, Cairo has a core strategic interest in ensuring that Hamas remains boxed in. The secular government of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is already preparing for a shaky leadership transition, which is bound to be exploited by the country's largest opposition movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
The MB, from which Hamas emerged, maintains links with the Hamas leadership. Egypt's powerful security apparatus has kept the MB in check, but the Egyptian group has steadily built up support among Egypt's lower and middle classes, which have grown disillusioned with the soaring rate of unemployment and lack of economic prospects in Egypt. The sight of Muslim Brotherhood activists leading protests in Egypt in the name of Hamas is thus quite disconcerting for the Mubarak regime. The Egyptians also are fearful that Gaza could become a haven for Salafist jihadist groups that could collaborate with Egypt's own jihadist node the longer Gaza remains in disarray under Hamas rule.
Of the Arab states, Jordan has the most to lose from a group like Hamas. More than three-fourths of the Hashemite monarchy's people claim Palestinian origins. The kingdom itself is a weak, poor state that historically has relied on the United Kingdom, Israel and the United States for its survival. Among all Arab governments, Amman has had the longest and closest relationship with Israel — even before it concluded a formal peace treaty with Israel in 1994. In 1970, Jordan waged war against Fatah when the group posed a threat to the kingdom's security; it also threw out Hamas in 1999 after fears that the group posed a similar threat to the stability of the kingdom. Like Egypt, Jordan also has a vibrant MB, which has closer ties to Hamas than its Egyptian counterpart. As far as Amman is concerned, therefore, the harder Israel hits Hamas, the better.
Finally, Syria is in a more complex position than these other four Arab states. The Alawite-Baathist regime in Syria has long been a pariah in the Arab world because of its support for Shiite Iran and for their mutual militant proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah. But ever since the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Syrians have been charting a different course, looking for ways to break free from diplomatic isolation and to reach some sort of understanding with the Israelis.
For the Syrians, support for Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and several other radical Palestinian outfits provides tools of leverage to use in negotiating a settlement with Israel. Any deal between the Syrians and the Israelis would thus involve Damascus sacrificing militant proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas in return for key concessions in Lebanon — where Syria's core geopolitical interests lie — and in the disputed Golan Heights. While the Israeli-Syrian peace talks remain in flux, Syria's lukewarm reaction to the Israeli offensive and restraint (thus far) from criticizing the more moderate Arab regimes' lack of response suggests Damascus may be looking to exploit the Gaza offensive to improve its relations in the Arab world and reinvigorate its talks with Israel. And the more da mage Israel does to Hamas now, the easier it will be for Damascus to crack down on Hamas should the need arise.
With Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria taking into account their own interests when dealing with the Palestinians, ironically, the most reliable patron Sunni Hamas has had in recent years is Iran, the Sunni Arab world's principal Shiite rival. Several key developments have made Hamas' gradual shift toward Iran possible:
1. Saudi Arabia's post-9/11 move into the moderate camp — previously dominated by Egypt and Jordan, two states that have diplomatic relations with Israel.
2. The collapse of Baathist Iraq and the resulting rise of Shiite power in the region.
3. The 2004 Iranian parliamentary elections that put Iran's ultraconservatives in power and the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose public anti-Israeli views resonated with Hamas at a time when other Arab states had grown more moderate.
4. The 2006 Palestinian elections, in which Hamas defeated its secular rival, Fatah, by a landslide. When endowed with the responsibility of running an unrecognized government, Hamas floundered between its goals of dominating the Palestinian political landscape and continuing to call for the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamist state. The Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, had hoped that the electoral victory would lead Hamas to moderate its stance, but Iran encouraged Hamas to adhere to its radical agenda. As the West increasingly isolated the Hamas-led government, the group shifted more toward the Iranian position, which more closely meshed with its original mandate.
5. The 2006 summer military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, in which Iranian-backed Hezbollah symbolically defeated the Jewish state. Hezbollah's ability to withstand the Israeli military onslaught gave confidence to Hamas that it could emulate the Lebanese Shiite movement — which, like Hamas, was both a political party and an armed paramilitary organization. Similar to their reaction to the current Gaza offensive, the principal Arab states condemned Hezbollah for provoking Israel and grew terrified at the outpouring of support for the Shiite militant group from their own populations. Hezbollah-Hamas collaboration in training, arms-procurement and funding intensified, and almost certainly has played a decisive role in equipping Hamas with 122mm BM-21 Grad artillery rockets and larger Iranian-made 240mm Fajr-3 rockets — and potentially even a modest anti-armor capability.
6. The June 2007 Hamas coup against Fatah in the Gaza Strip, which caused a serious strain in relations between Egypt and Hamas. The resulting blockade on Gaza put Egypt in an extremely uncomfortable position, in which it had to crack down on the Gaza border, thus giving the MB an excuse to rally opposition against Cairo. Egypt was already uncomfortable with Hamas' electoral victory, but it could not tolerate the group's emergence as the unchallenged power in Gaza.
7. Syria's decision to go public with peace talks with Israel. As soon as it became clear that Syria was getting serious about such negotiations, alarm bells went off within groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which now had to deal with the fear that Damascus could sell them out at any time as part of a deal with the Israelis.
Hamas' relations with the Arab states already were souring; its warming relationship with Iran has proved the coup de grace. Mubarak said it best when he recently remarked that the situation in the Gaza Strip "has led to Egypt, in practice, having a border with Iran." In other words, Hamas has allowed Iranian influence to come far too close for the Arab states' comfort.
In many ways, the falling-out between Hamas and the Arab regimes is not surprising. The decline of Nasserism in the late 1960s essentially meant the death of Arab nationalism. Even before then, the Arab states put their respective national interests ahead of any devotion to pan-Arab nationalism that would have translated into support for the Palestinian cause. As Islamism gradually came to replace Arab nationalism as a political force throughout the region, the Arab regimes became even more concerned about stability at home, given the very real threat of a religious challenge to their rule. While these states worked to suppress radical Islamist elements that had taken root in their countries, the Arab governments caught wind of Tehran's attempts to adopt the region's radical Islamist trend to create a geopolitical space for Iran in the Arab Middle East. As a result, the Arab-Persian struggle became one of the key drivers that has turned the Arab states against Hamas.
For each of these Arab states, Hamas represents a force that could stir the social pot at home — either by creating a backlash against the regimes for their ties to Israel and their perceived failure to aid the Palestinians, or by emboldening democratic Islamist movements in the region that could threaten the stability of both republican regimes and monarchies. With somewhat limited options to contain Iranian expansion in the region, the Arab states ironically are looking to Israel to ensure that Hamas remains boxed in. So, while on the surface it may seem that the entire Arab world is convulsing with anger at Israel's offensive against Hamas, a closer look reveals that the view from the Arab palace is quite different from the view on the Arab street.
Wednesday, January 07, 2009
Sweet Potato Soup with Chilies and Honey
I tried and loved this very easy recipe for sweet potato soup. The flavors are interesting and complex because of the mix of spicy/savory and sweet and because of the roasting of the sweet potatoes. In the dead of winter, I'm always craving creamy food and this is at least a little creamy without being full of the calories that usually come with creamy.
2 lbs fresh sweet potatoes, peeled and cut into wedges (I cut them into slabs of relatively uniform thickness so they cook evenly)
2 TBSP olive oil
1/2 tsp hot pepper flakes
1/2 tsp ground cumin
1/2 tsp salt
1/2 tsp black pepper
1/4 cup golden honey
6 cups chicken stock
Options for garnishes:
1/2 cup heavy cream whipped to soft peaks
1/2 cup fresh cilantro leaves, chopped
1/2 cup pumpkin seeds
Preheat oven to 375 F, with rack in the middle. Put all ingredients except stock (and optional garnishes) in a medium bowl and toss very well. Tip everything onto an ungreased heavy cookie sheet or shallow roasting pan. Bake at 375 F for 40 minutes, but check them after 25 minutes. (You don’t want any blackening on the edges, but you do want them to brown well in a few spots. If you get black spots on any of your wedges, don’t use them in the soup – just eat them.)
Put the stock in a large pan over medium heat and add the roasted sweet potatoes and simmer for 20 minutes.
Blend to a smooth puree, either with an immersion blender or in small batches in a blender. Check the consistency; if too thin, return to pot and simmer further; if too thick, add water or stock.
Optional: add garnish to dished soup. I recommend a good crusty bread to go along with it.
This recipe was printed in the Fall 2008 issue of Real Food, a magazine provided free by Lunds & Byerlys (my favorite grocery stores), and I post it here with permission from the magazine's editor, Dara Grumdahl. The recipe is the creation of caterer Serena Bass.
2 lbs fresh sweet potatoes, peeled and cut into wedges (I cut them into slabs of relatively uniform thickness so they cook evenly)
2 TBSP olive oil
1/2 tsp hot pepper flakes
1/2 tsp ground cumin
1/2 tsp salt
1/2 tsp black pepper
1/4 cup golden honey
6 cups chicken stock
Options for garnishes:
1/2 cup heavy cream whipped to soft peaks
1/2 cup fresh cilantro leaves, chopped
1/2 cup pumpkin seeds
Preheat oven to 375 F, with rack in the middle. Put all ingredients except stock (and optional garnishes) in a medium bowl and toss very well. Tip everything onto an ungreased heavy cookie sheet or shallow roasting pan. Bake at 375 F for 40 minutes, but check them after 25 minutes. (You don’t want any blackening on the edges, but you do want them to brown well in a few spots. If you get black spots on any of your wedges, don’t use them in the soup – just eat them.)
Put the stock in a large pan over medium heat and add the roasted sweet potatoes and simmer for 20 minutes.
Blend to a smooth puree, either with an immersion blender or in small batches in a blender. Check the consistency; if too thin, return to pot and simmer further; if too thick, add water or stock.
Optional: add garnish to dished soup. I recommend a good crusty bread to go along with it.
This recipe was printed in the Fall 2008 issue of Real Food, a magazine provided free by Lunds & Byerlys (my favorite grocery stores), and I post it here with permission from the magazine's editor, Dara Grumdahl. The recipe is the creation of caterer Serena Bass.
More on taxes from the CBO
From Mankiw:
...
Here are the total effective federal tax rates for 2005, the most recent year available:
Lowest quintile: 4.3 percent
...
Top 0.01 Percentile: 31.5 percent
N.B.: These figures include all federal taxes, not just income taxes.
...
Here are the total effective federal tax rates for 2005, the most recent year available:
Lowest quintile: 4.3 percent
...
Top 0.01 Percentile: 31.5 percent
N.B.: These figures include all federal taxes, not just income taxes.
Tax Transparency
A lot of talk going on about the President-elect’s tax concessions in order to get the Rethugs, or at least some of them, to go along with his economic recovery plan.
One of the ideas I’ve heard floated is a sort of tax holiday in which, instead of rebates, employers simply wouldn’t deduct any income taxes from the employee paychecks for a certain period. I used to think this would never happen because it would give taxpayers a painful reminder about taxes once the holiday ended and their checks went back down to the pre-holiday amount. It would make that income tax too transparent. Of course, any taxpayer with a brain sees the amount that is deducted but I believe there are many taxpayers who see their refunds as some sort of windfall they get every spring. I know people who actually ask employers to withhold at higher rates than necessary to enforce saving when they should have been using the time value of money to increase net worth. Because of lunacy like this, maybe a holiday can be safely implemented.
I also hear it tossed around a lot on the right that among industrialized nations, only Japan’s corporate income tax rate exceeds ours. I have never understood corporate income taxes except that politicians know they can succeed because they are not transparent. Corporations are not taxpayers; they are tax collectors. At least one’s local sales taxes are visible. Lawyers out there know there are ways to avoid those corporate income taxes on the federal level (at least for smaller businesses) by making a sub-S election or jumping through other hurdles. I don’t get why a corporation, upon reaching a certain size, should become a tax collector. If we want transparency, let’s drop the corporate income tax and increase my income tax accordingly.
One of the ideas I’ve heard floated is a sort of tax holiday in which, instead of rebates, employers simply wouldn’t deduct any income taxes from the employee paychecks for a certain period. I used to think this would never happen because it would give taxpayers a painful reminder about taxes once the holiday ended and their checks went back down to the pre-holiday amount. It would make that income tax too transparent. Of course, any taxpayer with a brain sees the amount that is deducted but I believe there are many taxpayers who see their refunds as some sort of windfall they get every spring. I know people who actually ask employers to withhold at higher rates than necessary to enforce saving when they should have been using the time value of money to increase net worth. Because of lunacy like this, maybe a holiday can be safely implemented.
I also hear it tossed around a lot on the right that among industrialized nations, only Japan’s corporate income tax rate exceeds ours. I have never understood corporate income taxes except that politicians know they can succeed because they are not transparent. Corporations are not taxpayers; they are tax collectors. At least one’s local sales taxes are visible. Lawyers out there know there are ways to avoid those corporate income taxes on the federal level (at least for smaller businesses) by making a sub-S election or jumping through other hurdles. I don’t get why a corporation, upon reaching a certain size, should become a tax collector. If we want transparency, let’s drop the corporate income tax and increase my income tax accordingly.
The Sopranos
One of the running jokes with my friends is how long it takes me to jump on bandwagons. Books, movies, music, tv. One prime example is Seinfeld. I didn't start watching it until maybe season 3 or 4, even when my friends were telling me how great it was. It WAS great. It IS great. In my opinion, the best tv series ever. The Sopranos is another example. My excuse is/was that I don't have HBO. But even after being released on dvd, it still took me until maybe last year to start checking the series out.
I finished Season 3 yesterday. While I'm finally getting and seeing the subtle humor (whether intentional or not is up to some debate I think), I'm still not seeing what all the hype was about. It's good, it's different, but I'm not sure I would have made it to season 3 if I had been watching it real time. As for the humor, I question the humor aspect based upon listening to the commentaries that are part of some of the episodes. The directors and the creator (David Chase) make comments about inside jokes, extremely subtle lines, the way the actors made something funny that might not have been written that way, etc. So that makes me question whether the humor was intended or just a part of the actors playing it that way. I guess it's both and maybe that is the genius that everyone else sees.
Season 3 did have, so far, my favorite episode - Pine Barrens. Basically a debt collection gone bad - way bad. The stuff in the woods is very funny and the comments on the commentary (by director Steve Buscemi of Fargo fame) gave a lot of insight into how they filmed the wood scenes. He mentioned several times how the actors underplayed scenes that made the humor even better. The episode had a very "Fargo" feel, which he said wasn't intentional at all. It just happened to snow at the location before and during the 4 day filming.
I will start Season 4 in the next week or so (thank you Netflix). I'm not sure what direction Season 4 will go in, but I have to think that a couple of the regular characters have to have something bad happen to them. Time will tell.
I finished Season 3 yesterday. While I'm finally getting and seeing the subtle humor (whether intentional or not is up to some debate I think), I'm still not seeing what all the hype was about. It's good, it's different, but I'm not sure I would have made it to season 3 if I had been watching it real time. As for the humor, I question the humor aspect based upon listening to the commentaries that are part of some of the episodes. The directors and the creator (David Chase) make comments about inside jokes, extremely subtle lines, the way the actors made something funny that might not have been written that way, etc. So that makes me question whether the humor was intended or just a part of the actors playing it that way. I guess it's both and maybe that is the genius that everyone else sees.
Season 3 did have, so far, my favorite episode - Pine Barrens. Basically a debt collection gone bad - way bad. The stuff in the woods is very funny and the comments on the commentary (by director Steve Buscemi of Fargo fame) gave a lot of insight into how they filmed the wood scenes. He mentioned several times how the actors underplayed scenes that made the humor even better. The episode had a very "Fargo" feel, which he said wasn't intentional at all. It just happened to snow at the location before and during the 4 day filming.
I will start Season 4 in the next week or so (thank you Netflix). I'm not sure what direction Season 4 will go in, but I have to think that a couple of the regular characters have to have something bad happen to them. Time will tell.
Medicare/Social Security Ponzi Scheme
From John Stossel at JWR:
Ten years after Social Security passed in 1935, there were almost 42 workers for each retiree. Five years later, the ratio slipped to about 17 to 1. Now it's about 3.4 to 1. Thirty years from now, the ratio is projected to be 2 to 1.
Think of the burden on those two to three workers who'll have to support one retiree for 15 to 20 years.
With African-American males having the shortest life spans and white women having the longest...who's taking care of my mother?
Ten years after Social Security passed in 1935, there were almost 42 workers for each retiree. Five years later, the ratio slipped to about 17 to 1. Now it's about 3.4 to 1. Thirty years from now, the ratio is projected to be 2 to 1.
Think of the burden on those two to three workers who'll have to support one retiree for 15 to 20 years.
With African-American males having the shortest life spans and white women having the longest...who's taking care of my mother?
Tuesday, January 06, 2009
Thank you credit/financial/mortgage crisis
To date, the only effect the financial crisis has had on C and I was in a negative way, as mentioned here. Well, now we've had a positive. I spent most of the day yesterday on the phone going through the process of refinancing our mortgage. Went from a 30yr @ 6.58% to a 15yr @ 4.69%. Our monthly payment went up just a bit, but the prospect of paying off the mortgage in at least half the time is very, very attractive. Then we can start on the vacation cabin in Wisconsin.
Monday, January 05, 2009
Re: Daily Coyote
Wow. I finally took the time. Those photos are amazing. Even if this ultimately ends not so well (as I suspect it might), it is an interesting experiment.
Take your time and follow Stephanie's advice and start from the beginning.
Take your time and follow Stephanie's advice and start from the beginning.
Dallas "winter" weather
The weather in the DFW is so weird. Saturday C and I were doing yard work (raking leaves, cleaning gutters, taking down Christmas decorations) wearing shorts with the temp near 80. Yesterday, it never got above 44. Today, freezing rain and temps near freezing. A week or so before we left for Wisconsin for Christmas, it was 80, then down to the highs in the 20's for 3 days, up to the 50's, then down to the 30's and back to the 70's in the span of 7 days.
Can anyone say...climate change????
Can anyone say...climate change????
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